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INTRODUCTION
The recent wave of behavioral economics has led some theo-
rists to advocate the possibility of "libertarian paternalism," in
which regulators designing institutions permit significant indi-
vidual choice but nonetheless use default rules to "nudge" cogni-
tively biased individuals toward particular salutary choices.' In
this Article, we add the possibility of a different kind of nudge:
temporary law.
The case for temporary law arises from a particular regula-
tory rationale. In some cases, the best normative defense of reg-
ulation against the libertarian critique-the best response to the
claim that free market competition produces efficiency-is path
dependence, the idea that market institutions can become
trapped or locked in to a suboptimal equilibrium, even when
1 The term "libertarian paternalism" comes from Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H.
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U Chi L Rev 1159, 1174-77
(2003) (advocating default rules and other types of choice architecture to overcome cogni-
tive limitations without depriving individuals of choice), and Richard H. Thaler and Cass
R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 Am Econ Rev 175, 177-79 (2003) (same). For
the comprehensive statement of their approach, with many policy examples, see general-
ly Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health,
Wealth, and Happiness (Penguin 2009). See also generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Un-
certain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw U L Rev 1165 (2003) (identifying the
limited conditions under which behavioral psychology justifies paternalism); Colin
Camerer, et al, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
'Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U Pa L Rev 1211 (2003) (defending paternalism through
mechanisms such as default rules and cooling-off periods that benefit those subject to
cognitive limitations without constraining others). See also J.D. Trout, Paternalism and
Cognitive Bias, 24 L & Phil 393, 409-11 (2005) (justifying paternalism with cognitive
biases, but arguing for the least intrusive intervention). The influence of the idea ex-
tends beyond legal scholarship. See David C. Wheeler, et al, Applying Strategies from
Libertarian Paternalism to Decision Making for Prostate Specific Antigen (PSA) Screen-
ing, 11 BMC Cancer 148, 149 (2011) (proposing default rules and information framing to
nudge patients away from unnecessary PSA screening).
For criticisms, see generally Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U
Chi L Rev 133 (2006) (arguing that bounded rationality undermines the case for pater-
nalism when individuals have a stronger incentive to overcome bias and "choose well"
when purchasing than when voting); Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an
Oxymoron, 99 Nw U L Rev 1245 (2005) (critiquing libertarian paternalism on multiple
grounds).
2014] Temporary Law
some better equilibrium exists.2 For our purposes, it suffices to
define an equilibrium as a behavioral outcome that is stable in
this way because no one individual gains by changing behavior
given what the other individuals are doing.3 Some situations al-
low for multiple equilibria: multiple behavioral patterns that,
once reached, are stable. When this is true, there is no reason to
expect that the outcome that market competition produces will
inevitably be the best one, the global social optimum. Instead, it
may be merely a "local maximum." The outcome that occurs
therefore depends arbitrarily on the behavioral starting point;
different paths do not all lead to efficiency.4
A few legal scholars have explored the relevance of path-
dependent legal evolution, 5 particularly in corporate law.6 The
2 The literature on path dependence spans the social sciences. See generally W.
Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (Michigan 1994)
(providing an economic theory of path dependence); Scott E. Page, Path Dependence, 1 Q
J Polit Sci 87 (2006) (reviewing the use of path dependence in political science theory);
James Mahoney, Path Dependence in Historical Sociology, 29 Theory & Society 507
(2000) (reviewing path dependence in history and sociology). Not surprisingly, there is no
single meaning of the term, but we follow a common usage in referring to the fact that
the equilibrium that exists is not the only one possible within the same parameters (in-
dividual preferences and wealth) but that trivial differences in starting points or exoge-
nous events along the way produced the current equilibrium. For a criticism of the con-
cept as applied to product markets, see S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, Path
Dependence, Lock-in, and History, 11 J L, Econ & Org 205, 215-23 (1995).
3 Put differently, an equilibrium is a pattern of individual behavior that "may be
rationally sustained as unique best responses to each other." Roger B. Myerson, Justice,
Institutions, and Multiple Equilibria, 5 Chi J Intl L 91, 92 (2004). More technically, in
game theory, a Nash equilibrium
is based on the principle that the combination of strategies that players are
likely to choose is one in which no player could do better by choosing a different
strategy given the ones the others choose. [In two-player games, a] pair of
strategies will form a Nash equilibrium if each strategy is one that cannot be
improved upon given the other strategy. We establish whether a particular
strategy combination forms a Nash equilibrium by asking if either player has
an incentive to deviate from it.
Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law
310 (Harvard 1994) (emphasis omitted).
4 There are several technical matters of path dependence that need not detain us.
For example, one might distinguish between path dependence that arises because of triv-
ial differences in initial conditions and path dependence that arises because of identical
initial conditions combined with random differences in intervening events. The analysis
that follows will work under different assumptions about how path dependency arises.
5 See generally Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of
History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U Chi L Rev 573 (2000); Oona A.
Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a
Common Law System, 86 Iowa L Rev 601 (2001) (identifying three types of path depend-
ency and finding examples of each in the common law); Alain Marciano and Elias L.
Khalil, Optimization, Path Dependence and the Law: Can Judges Promote Efficiency?, 32
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fields of intellectual property and antitrust are also concerned
with the path dependence of technological change. 7 But the gen-
eral literature on regulation has, quite surprisingly, not appre-
ciated the importance of the concept to discussions of market
failure, a shortcoming we hope to correct. Most importantly for
our purposes, the literature has failed to note this rather sur-
prising implication: temporary law may have a significant ad-
vantage over permanent law. When the rationale for regulation
is to overcome path dependence, there is no need for a perma-
nent restriction on liberty and there are several critical reasons
to make the restriction temporary.
We thus propose imagining regulations that include an ex-
piration date. Our principal example for illustrating these points
is the regulation of smoking in public places, a field that has
seen substantial change in recent years. Libertarians and other
market optimists assert that, in the absence of government reg-
ulation, competition among private suppliers would produce the
optimal number of nonsmoking establishments-malls, restau-
rants, bars, apartment buildings s Yet when the government did
not regulate, nonsmokers felt that there were an insufficient
number of nonsmoking options. In our personal observations
across many jurisdictions, there were literally no nonsmoking
bars, meaning that there was no good option for nonsmokers.
Intl Rev L & Econ 72 (2012) (critiquing path dependency claims about the inefficiency of
judge-made law). See also generally Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-in Effects in Law and
Norms, 78 BU L Rev 813 (1998) (claiming that path dependence affects the development
of informal social norms as much as the development of formal law).
6 See generally Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corpo-
rate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior, and Cognitive Biases, 74 Wash U L
Q 347 (1996); Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 Stan L Rev 127 (1999); Amir N. Licht, The
Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Govern-
ance Systems, 26 Del J Corp L 147 (2001).
7 See Mark A. Lemley and David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Eco-
nomic Effects, 86 Cal L Rev 479, 500-41 (1998). An early example of the economic litera-
ture is W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by
Historical Events, 99 Econ J 116, 123-28 (1989). For a recent review of that literature,
see generally Joseph Farrell and Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-in: Competi-
tion with Switching Costs and Network Effects, in Mark Armstrong and Robert H. Por-
ter, eds, 3 Handbook of Industrial Organization 1967 (Elsevier 2007) (surveying the eco-
nomic literature).
8 See Thomas A. Lambert, The Case against Smoking Bans, 29 Regulation 34, 40
(Winter 2006-2007) (arguing against smoking bans); Eric A. Feldman and Ronald Bayer,
Introduction, in Eric A. Feldman and Ronald Bayer, eds, Unfiltered: Conflicts over To-
bacco Policy and Public Health 1, 6-7 (Harvard 2004) (describing the libertarian objec-
tions).
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What does it mean for nonsmokers to complain that, with-
out government intervention, the market is underserving their
needs? One possibility is that the only equilibrium consisted of a
small number of nonsmoking options because smokers cared
much more about the issue than nonsmokers. In other words, if
the only choice is smoking, nonsmokers patronize the establish-
ment and grumble, but if the only choice is nonsmoking, smok-
ers stay home and withhold their patronage altogether. This is
the intuition of the libertarian, who explains that nonsmokers
are being hypocritical because they are not willing to pay suffi-
ciently to induce bars, restaurants, and other establishments to
switch to nonsmoking.
Yet there is a second possibility: path dependence. For rea-
sons explored below, rational mechanisms and behavioral biases
could have created a situation in which the same set of prefer-
ences and levels of wealth permit at least two equilibrium out-
comes, one with a high proportion of smoking establishments
and the other with a low proportion. In this context, an equilib-
rium means that no owner of an establishment has any incen-
tive to change the smoking status of the establishment because
she is making as much or more profit with the smoking policy
she has. If there are multiple equilibria, then it is possible that
the low-smoking equilibrium is optimal, and we have reached
the high-smoking equilibrium only because of the happenstance
that our starting point from decades ago, when preferences and
beliefs about smoking were different, involved high smoking
rates and near-universal tolerance of smoking. Had history been
different, the same preferences (the ones that existed before
smoking bans) could have sustained a different and lower level
of smoking establishments. If freedom of choice and market
competition are consistent with two behavioral patterns, we
should want to reach the efficient pattern, not the one that hap-
pens to emerge first.
Given path dependence, it may be desirable to use law to
shift society from the high-smoking to the low-smoking equilib-
rium. Across a large domain of issues besides smoking, the best
argument that can be made for legal intervention and the most
charitable interpretation of the arguments that are made is ex-
actly this point: that the status quo is trapped in an inefficient
equilibrium and that law will shift the system to a more desira-
ble equilibrium, one that is also consistent with individual
choice to satisfy existing preferences.
20141
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The possibility that multiple equilibria exist in a variety of
regulatory contexts has never been thoroughly considered. Part
of this Article's contribution is to identify a list of mechanisms
that can produce multiple equilibria. Our main point, however,
is to explain why, when multiple equilibria exist, the best re-
sponse is usually a temporary law. If the problem is path de-
pendence, a temporary law will often be both necessary and suf-
ficient to move behavior to the more efficient outcome. For
example, suppose the status quo among a city's restaurants is a
high-smoking equilibrium (95 percent permit smoking) and we
believe there is a more efficient low-smoking equilibrium (10
percent permit smoking). If the temporary law bans smoking in
all restaurants for a certain time period (say, two years), it
pushes toward a zero-smoking outcome. When the law is re-
moved, restaurant owners will decide whether to allow smoking
again; many will. But the implication of there being a low-
smoking equilibrium is that the number of restaurants allowing
smoking will rise from zero to the number the low-smoking equi-
librium represents (10 percent) and then stop. In short, the con-
cept of path dependence identifies the importance of arbitrary
starting points; temporary law offers a new "starting" point, re-
setting the system to allow the emergence of the equilibrium
with the lowest smoking levels.
It should be immediately apparent that the temporary law
cannot be a first-best solution. The first-best solution would be
to move directly to the more efficient equilibrium. In the smok-
ing example, part of the cost of the temporary ban is the ineffi-
ciency of having too few restaurants-zero-that allow smoking
during the period the law is in effect. If the efficient low-smoking
equilibrium is that 10 percent of restaurants allow smoking,
then the state could just create licenses equal to 10 percent of
the restaurants and allocate them by auction or lottery, enforc-
ing a ban against only unlicensed restaurants. If this is the situ-
ation, there is no advantage to making the law temporary, as a
permanent law merely requires people to do what they already
want to do in equilibrium.
The problem, however, is that this first-best, direct solution
demands costly or unobtainable information. We might have no
good way of estimating the exact location of the low-smoking
equilibrium. And here we see the possible advantage of a tempo-
rary law. If we are uncertain what the low-smoking equilibrium
is-perhaps it is 10 percent of restaurants, but it could be as
[81:291
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high as 35 percent or as low as 5 percent-we will likely grant
too many or too few licenses, thereby forcing an inefficient level
of smoking indefinitely. With the temporary law, the short-term
inefficiency is likely greater-requiring 0 percent smoking res-
taurants is too low-but lasts for only a limited period, after
which voluntary exchange produces the low-smoking equilibri-
um.
This revelation-what might be called "equilibrium loca-
tion"-is only the first informational advantage of temporary
law. For the second, assume there is also uncertainty or ambigu-
ity about the entire situation just described. There may be mul-
tiple equilibria, but there is also some chance that there is really
only one behavioral pattern consistent with existing preferences
and free exchange. If so, the libertarian has a good reason to as-
sert that the status quo already represents the efficient out-
come. The licensing scheme then imposes a severe inefficiency
(for example, 10 percent of restaurants are smoking when 95
percent is efficient) for an indefinite time. It also offers no mech-
anism for revealing whether the licensing scheme represents a
suboptimal outcome. But when the temporary law expires, if the
premise on which it was based were false, and there were only
one equilibrium, then restaurants would return to their initial
level of permitting smoking (95 percent). We will then learn that
there was no market failure to be solved. Thus, temporary law
works like an experiment. The information it reveals is both
equilibrium location and what might be called "equilibrium veri-
fication."
We identify a number of other advantages to temporary law.
By verifying and locating the other equilibrium, one saves on en-
forcement costs, as by definition there is no need to enforce an
equilibrium. There is also the promise of greater intellectual
honesty: once temporary law is a salient part of the regulatory
tool kit, those who claim that path dependence justifies regula-
tion will propose only temporary law, while those who propose
permanent law will be forced to claim some justification other
than path dependence. Finally, temporary law is a form of polit-
ical compromise that might decrease the costs of political strug-
gles. 9 Proponents of regulation will accomplish their goal but
9 See Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U Chi L Rev 247, 262-68 (2007)
(offering a positive political theory explaining when legislation is made temporary). See
also generally Frank Fagan, Law and the Limits of Government: Temporary versus Per-
manent Legislation (Edward Elgar 2013).
20141
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will, by accepting an expiration date, bear the costs of extension.
Opponents of regulation will be less opposed to temporary rules
than permanent ones. Furthermore, if the proponents and oppo-
nents of regulation have genuine uncertainty about the conse-
quences of a particular intervention, they might welcome the in-
formation revealed by the temporary law.
Situations of multiple equilibria are common, and we offer a
number of examples to demonstrate the phenomenon. In ration-
al-choice theory, there are various kinds of coordination games
that have multiple equilibria.10 We discuss these situations, but
we also emphasize the role of bounded rationality and cognitive
biases. Cognitive limitations often produce an important asym-
metry: the operation of various biases favors the status quo and
is therefore capable of stabilizing more than one behavioral out-
come, should it become the status quo. Consider, for example,
the availability heuristic, by which people tend to overestimate
the occurrence of things readily called to mind." In a world in
which restaurant smoking is permitted, it may be easier for res-
taurant owners to call to mind those smoking customers they
will lose by prohibiting smoking than to imagine nonsmoking
customers whom they haven't met whose patronage they will
gain from a smoking ban. After living with a smoking ban, how-
ever, the reverse is true: the actual nonsmoking customers they
will lose from permitting smoking are more salient than poten-
tial smoking customers they will gain. By shifting the composi-
tion of the baseline set of customers, a temporary ban can
change the beliefs of the restaurant owners in a way that makes
their behavior sticky.
Another example is the problem of forecasting one's affect.
The happiness literature shows that people adapt to new situa-
tions more quickly than they expect.1 2 Smokers who have no ex-
perience at nonsmoking restaurants may expect to be miserable
10 See Russell W. Cooper, Coordination Games: Complementarities and Macroeco-
nomics 9 (Cambridge 1999) (describing coordination games and noting that "history mat-
ters in these games and uncovering the influence of the past on the selection of an equi-
librium is important"); Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners' Dilemma:
Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S Cal L Rev 209, 218-25 (2009) (arguing that
legal scholarship overuses the prisoners' dilemma and fails to exploit the insights of co-
ordination games with multiple equilibria); Richard H. McAdams, Conventions and
Norms: Philosophical Aspects, in Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes, eds, 4 International
Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences 2735, 2736-38 (Elsevier 2001) (explain-
ing conventions as solutions to recurrent coordination games).
11 See notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
12 See note 68 and accompanying text.
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at them and to take a long time to adjust to being unable to
smoke; they therefore avoid all the nonsmoking restaurants
when there are only a few of them. After living with a complete
ban, however, they adjust to the experience (by not smoking for
a period or stepping outside) more quickly than they predicted
and are therefore willing occasionally to patronize nonsmoking
restaurants. Although they still prefer smoking restaurants,
their occasional patronage of nonsmoking restaurants means
that more restaurants will stay nonsmoking. We explore these
points more systematically below.
Thus, the domain we identify for temporary law, in which it
is presumptively superior to permanent law, is when (1) it ap-
pears there are multiple equilibria and the status quo is trapped
in an inefficient one and (2) there are informational barriers to
identifying the superior equilibrium. We also consider some
costs of temporary law that render it unsuitable in certain con-
texts.
This Article sits at the intersection of two different legal lit-
eratures. First, there are a handful of articles on temporary leg-
islation. Professor Jacob Gersen has offered a positive political
theory of temporary legislation, arguing that it advantages the
legislature over the executive. 13 As a normative matter, Gersen
speculates that temporality might desirably spread decision
costs over time in a way that might lead to better-informed regu-
lation, particularly for newly recognized risks.14 Professor Yair
Listokin identifies the advantages of experimenting with legal
policy.15 If there is uncertainty over the effects of a proposed law,
one might adopt a law temporarily, assess the results, and then
13 Gersen, 74 U Chi L Rev at 248 (cited in note 9).
14 See id.
15 See Yair Listokin, Learning through Policy Variation, 118 Yale L J 480, 522-33
(2008) (advocating the value of policy reversibility in cost-benefit analysis and arguing
that, facing uncertainty, reversibility allows the policy maker to learn, retaining new pol-
icies that produce net benefits and abandoning those that produce net costs). See also
Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres, and Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U Pa L Rev
929, 975-79 (2011) (recommending the use of legal experiments by changing law for lim-
ited and randomly selected subpopulations and observing the results); Yoon-Ho Alex Lee,
An Options Approach to Agency Rulemaking, 65 Admin L Rev 881, 904-06 (2013) (rec-
ommending that agencies regulate so as to preserve future options and then commit to
reevaluating past regulations and modifying them if appropriate to obtain greater future
regulatory benefits); Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in Cary Coglianese, ed,
Regulatory Breakdown: The Crisis of Confidence in U.S. Regulation 86, 95-106 (Penn-
sylvania 2012); Rob van Gestel and Gijs van Dijck, Better Regulation through Experi-
mental Legislation, 17 Eur Pub L 539, 539-44 (2011).
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decide whether to renew the law, with or without modification.16
Policy makers should therefore choose highly variable policies
when they can be easily reversed or altered and lower-variance
policies when it will be more difficult to make changes after the
fact.17
These theories do not discuss the problem of path depend-
ence; as a result, the rationales they provide for temporary law
are more contingent. For Gersen and Listokin, there is always
the alternative of enacting a permanent law and later repealing
it if the results show the law to be a failure. So the choice be-
tween a formally permanent and temporary law is merely a
matter of allocating the burden of future change on either the
law's opponents, who must secure repeal, or the law's propo-
nents, who must secure renewal. That is an interesting norma-
tive tradeoff, but it is entirely distinct from the rationale we ex-
plore.
When the argument for regulating is the existence of multi-
ple equilibria and path dependence, the case for temporary law
is less contingent. In this setting, one wants the law to lapse af-
ter a time not because it has failed, but in order to allow it to
succeed. The law's success cannot be judged while it is in effect,
but only after it expires, when a new equilibrium does or does
not emerge. If the new equilibrium is the same as the status quo
ante, the rationale for regulation is rejected. If the new equilib-
rium is something different and better, the rationale is affirmed
but the regulation is no longer necessary. If we are committed
incrementalists and the costs of overcoming legislative inertia
are sufficiently low, it might make sense for almost all laws to
be temporary. But even if we reject incrementalism18 and the
costs of overcoming legislative inertia are high, we would still
argue for temporary law to address the problem of path depend-
ence.
This Article also engages and extends a second literature:
the project of behavioral economics to identify important policy
implications of cognitive limitations and behavioral biases. Of
course, rational-choice mechanisms can also create path depend-
ence, as some of our examples will show. For that reason, the
normative case for temporary law need not depend on the findings
16 See Listokin, 118 Yale L J at 522-33 (cited in note 15).
17 See id at 522-26.
18 For a shrewd analysis of its costs, see generally Saul Levmore, Interest Groups
and the Problem with Incrementalism, 158 U Pa L Rev 815 (2010).
300 [81:291
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of behavioral research. But we find that the most easily general-
ized reason for multiple equilibria and path dependence is the
asymmetric effects of cognitive biases. Those biases will often
push in favor of the status quo, so that two arbitrarily different
starting points can produce two different equilibria. Only by ac-
cident will the bias favor the selection of the efficient equilibri-
um.
This Article fits broadly within the debate Professors Cass
Sunstein and Richard Thaler started with their defense of liber-
tarian paternalism. 19 In many (though not all) of the examples,
the temporary law we explore is unquestionably paternalistic.
Yet temporary paternalism is better for the libertarian than the
permanent kind. It may even ultimately be less intrusive on lib-
erty than some of the "nudges" Sunstein and Thaler defend. Be-
yond a simple temporal compromise, the possibility of temporary
legislation forces greater intellectual honesty on those who ad-
vocate some restriction on liberty. If the advocate of regulation
relies on the claim of multiple equilibria and path dependence,
then she should presumptively favor merely temporary legisla-
tion. If, over time, temporary legislation exposes the general fal-
sity of claims of path dependence, then it will strengthen the
hand of the libertarian to resist even temporary paternalism.
The final advantage of temporary law is that it may serve the
value of liberty in this manner. A possible implication of our
analysis (assuming no market failures other than path depend-
ence) is that many laws, including many antismoking laws,
should be repealed (after which we suspect there would remain
far fewer smoking establishments than existed prior to the ban).
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I we explain the be-
havioral forces that can lead to multiple equilibria and path de-
pendence with a particular case study: bans on smoking in pub-
lic places. In Part II we generalize from this example and
describe the advantages and disadvantages of temporary legisla-
tion, focusing on its role in exposing situations of path depend-
ence. Part III offers a suggestive empirical study of a temporary
19 See Sunstein and Thaler, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1174-77 (cited in note 1); Sunstein
and Thaler, 93 Am Econ Rev at 175 (cited in note 1). See also generally Thaler and Sun-
stein, Nudge (cited in note 1). The debate includes the argument that Sunstein and Tha-
ler are too paternalistic, see generally Mitchell, 99 Nw U L Rev 1245 (cited in note 1),
and not paternalistic enough, given their behavioral premises. See Ryan Bubb and Rich-
ard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 Harv L Rev
(forthcoming 2014), online at http://papers.ssrn.consol3/papers.cfm?abstractid = 2331000
(visited Mar 2, 2014).
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smoking ban, using the example of an actual (albeit unintended)
temporary ban that governed Champaign, Illinois. Part IV ex-
tends the analysis to other examples, including seat belt regula-
tion, affirmative action, traffic regulation, curfews, and bank
holidays and trading circuit breakers.
I. MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND THE EXAMPLE OF SMOKING
BEHAVIOR
Markets produce equilibria, and naive free market advo-
cates tend to assume that these equilibria are always efficient.
But the fact that a competitive market has generated a particu-
lar equilibrium does not mean that the equilibrium is socially
optimal, even if the equilibrium is the product of voluntary ex-
change with reasonably low transaction costs. Rather, both be-
havioral biases and rational-choice mechanisms can create situ-
ations in which multiple equilibria are possible. The choice of
equilibrium in such situations is then path dependent: different
starting points and histories generate different behavioral pat-
terns, even when other underlying parameters are constant.
When the status quo is trapped in an inferior equilibrium, tem-
porary regulation may work to move the population to a better
equilibrium.
We develop these points using the controversy surrounding
smoking regulation. We have in mind the laws that have in-
creasingly prohibited smoking in various public and now private
spaces: hospitals, airports, shopping malls, stadia, theatres, res-
taurants, bars, hotels, cars carrying child passengers, and
apartments. 0 Despite their popularity, there is in most cases a
reasonable libertarian/free market argument against the regula-
tion.21
In this Part, we use only the example of smoking bans,
though we shall later generalize the analysis.
20 See Committee on Secondhand Smoke Exposure and Acute Coronary Events,
Secondhand Smoke and Cardiovascular Effects: Making Sense of the Evidence 109-24
(National Academies 2010) (reviewing history of smoking bans); Charles R. Shipan and
Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, 52 Am J Polit Sci 840, 845-54 (2008)
(describing diffusion of smoking bans in the United States).
21 See, for example, Lambert, 29 Regulation at 34 (cited in note 8). These specific
arguments are applications of the analysis of market libertarians stated in classic works.
See, for example, Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose 222-27 (Harcourt
1980); Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 220-33 (Chicago 1960).
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A. The Libertarian/Economic Argument against Smoking Bans
Smoking bans have become increasingly popular in the
United States and around the world in the years since California
enacted the first ban in 1994.22 As of 2011, twenty-five states
and the District of Columbia had enacted statewide smoke-free
laws governing workplaces, restaurants, and/or bars.23 A grow-
ing number of cities and counties across the country have also
taken action, and one source reports that as of 2004, 2,300 mu-
nicipalities have bans in some form, up from 89 in 1985.24
The spread of smoking bans has resulted from a number of
factors. One is the growing awareness of the health dangers as-
sociated with smoking.25 The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention reports that 19.0 percent of Americans smoked as of
2011, down from 33.2 percent in 1980.26 As the percentage of
voters who are smokers has declined, it has become easier for
smoking bans to pass. 27 Finally, the spread of smoking bans is
22 Ronald Bayer and James Colgrove, Children and Bystanders First: The Ethics
and Politics of Tobacco Control in the United States, in Feldman and Bayer, eds, Unfil-
tered 8, 25 (cited in note 8).
23 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 25 States and DC Are Smoke-Free,
online at http://www.cdc.gov/features/smoke-freelaws/index.html (visited Mar 2, 2014).
24 Bayer and Colgrove, Children and Bystanders First at 8 (cited in note 22).
25 The 1964 Surgeon General's report on smoking is widely cited as a turning point.
See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, The Health Consequences of Smoking: A
Report of the Surgeon General *897 (May 27, 2004), online at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco
/datastatistics/sgr/2004/complete-reportlindex.htm (visited Mar 2, 2014). See also The-
odore R. Marmor and Evan S. Lieberman, Tobacco Control in Comparative Perspective:
Eight Nations in Search of an Explanation, in Feldman and Bayer, eds, Unfiltered 275,
276 (cited in note 8).
26 Gary A. Giovino, et al, Surveillance for Selected Tobacco-Use Behaviors-United
States, 1900-1994, 43 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Rpt Surveillance Summary 1, 8-
10 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Nov 18, 1994), online at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwrlPDF/ss/ss4303.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014) (Table 2 has 1980 da-
ta); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Adult Cigarette Smoking in the United
States: Current Estimate (June 5, 2013), online at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco
/datastatistics/fact-sheets/adult.datacig-smokingindex.htm (visited Mar 2, 2014).
Nevertheless, some believe that legal regulation has been a failure in that levels of
smoking remain higher than they ought to be, a fact they attribute to cognitive biases
that distort analysis of risk. See Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, The Joint Failure
of Economic Theory and Legal Regulation, in Paul Slovic, ed, Smoking: Risk, Perception
& Policy 229, 229-31 (Sage 2001).
27 Furthermore, there are a nontrivial number of smokers who support smoking
bans, most likely as a commitment device to help them quit. See Joni Hersch, Smoking
Restrictions as a Self-Control Mechanism, 31 J Risk & Uncertainty 5, 18-20 (2005) (find-
ing that smokers who plan to quit and especially those who failed to quit on a previous
occasion support public smoking bans as an aid to quitting). See also Silke Anger, Mi-
chael Kvasnicka, and Thomas Siedler, One Last Puff? Public Smoking Bans and
Smoking Behavior, 30 J Health Econ 591, 593-97 (2011) (finding that public smoking
2014]
The University of Chicago Law Review [81:291
also an example of what political scientists call "policy diffu-
sion," in which jurisdictions copy the policies of other jurisdic-
tions.28
As smoking bans have spread, there has been increased de-
bate over their consequences. Proponents of bans believe that
they contribute to the declining rates of smoking and point to ev-
idence that bans have been associated with health improve-
ment.29 While some of the evidence is contested, it is safe to say
that the vast majority of public health analysts support smoking
bans.
Opponents, on the other hand, argue that bans interfere
with individual liberty and dispute the underlying science. Lib-
ertarians and some smokers tend to view smoking bans as pa-
ternalistic regulations interfering with liberty and market pro-
cesses. 30 A key issue in this debate has been the nature and
extent of the externalities associated with smoking. Ban propo-
nents have had great success in exploiting the issue of
secondhand smoke. They have framed the issue using the lan-
guage of rights, arguing that smokers' rights end at the nose of
bans reduce the incidence of the smoking habit among some subpopulations in Germa-
ny).
28 See Shipan and Volden, 52 Am J Polit Sci at 840 (cited in note 20). More specifi-
cally, "diffusion" refers to the idea that the probability of a jurisdiction adopting a given
policy increases as other jurisdictions adopt the policy. See generally Allan M. Brandt,
Difference and Diffusion: Cross-Cultural Perspectives on the Rise of Anti-tobacco Policies,
in Feldman and Bayer, eds, Unfiltered 255 (cited in note 8); Marmor and Lieberman, To-
bacco Control in Comparative Perspective at 285-86 (cited in note 25). The effect has
been observed in a wide variety of domestic and international settings. It may be at-
tributable to learning across jurisdictions, or changes in costs and benefits associated
with particular policies (for example, losing business to a neighboring jurisdiction that
has adopted a more desirable policy). See Zachary Elkins and Beth Simmons, On Waves,
Clusters and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework, 598 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci
33, 39-42 (2005) (describing various channels of policy diffusion). In the case of smoking
bans there also appear to be direct international pressures at work as well. See Brandt,
Difference and Diffusion at 270-73 (cited in note 28) (international enforcement).
29 For example, a study conducted in Pueblo, Colorado, showed that the incidence of
acute myocardial infarction-that is, heart attacks-declined after a smoking ban was
adopted within the city limits. Carl Bartecchi, et al, Reduction in the Incidence of Acute
Myocardial Infarction Associated with a Citywide Smoking Ordinance, 114 Circulation
1490, 1494-95 (2006).
30 See, for example, Lambert, 29 Regulation at 34 (cited in note 8); Mark J.
Horvick, Examining the Underlying Purposes of Municipal and Statewide Smoking
Bans, 80 Ind L J 923, 924 (2005); Joni Ogle, Why Smoking Bans Are a Butt to Texas: The
Impact of Smoking Bans on Private Property Rights and Individual Freedom, 39 Tex
Tech L Rev 345, 347 (2007) (all arguing against smoking bans); Feldman and Bayer, In-
troduction at 6-7 (cited in note 8) (describing the libertarian objections).
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nonsmokers.31 Smoking bans are needed, it is argued, to protect
the employees of restaurants and bars who have no choice but to
be exposed.32 The argument has had a powerful effect in chang-
ing public attitudes toward smoking bans, 33 though it has some
weaknesses, as we explain below.
Libertarians counter that the vast majority of negative
health effects associated with smoking are felt by the smoker
herself and that the science on secondhand effects is much
weaker. 34 Their view is that the "regulation of cigarette use has
far outstripped scientific concerns about risk to others."35 They
also raise the idea of a slippery slope.36 If one can justify pater-
nalistic policies by the simple fact that they may save lives, then
government can prohibit any risky activity that people freely
choose-mountain climbing, playing football, eating fatty foods,
working in an underground mine, or being a couch potato-all at
the expense of liberty.
More relevant for our purposes is a second point. Even as-
suming secondhand smoke is dangerous, if people are fully in-
formed, they will efficiently sort themselves by their preferences.
In the absence of transactions costs, the Coase Theorem implies
that voluntary exchange produces an efficient outcome.37 There
always are transaction costs, but if they are low, the standard
argument is that voluntary exchange allows an outcome closer
to efficiency than an outcome imposed by government. First,
employees who dislike smoking may demand a wage premium to
work in a smoking establishment, as the economic evidence
31 See Feldman and Bayer, Introduction at 18-27 (cited in note 8).
32 See id.
33 See Eric A. Feldman and Ronald Bayer, Conclusion: Lessons from the Compara-
tive Study of Tobacco Control, in Feldman and Bayer, eds, Unfiltered 292, 292 (cited in
note 8) ("The identification of vulnerable third parties held to be in need of protection
has been a crucial justification for anti-tobacco policy and advocacy.").
34 See Joseph L. Bast and Maureen Martin, Why Defend Smokers?, in Joseph L.
Bast, Please Don't Poop in My Salad and Other Essays against the War on Smoking 3, 6
(Heartland 2006); Joseph L. Bast, Leave Those Poor Smokers Alone!, in Bast, Please
Don't Poop in My Salad 11, 12-13 (cited in note 34).
35 Brandt, Difference and Diffusion at 261 (cited in note 28).
36 See Joel Sherman, Foreword, in Bast, Please Don't Poop in My Salad v, vii (cited
in note 34).
37 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 15-19 (1960). The
article states no formal theorem but the modern understanding is that it proposes that,
"when transaction costs are zero, an efficient result will be reached, regardless of the ini-
tial assignment of legal entitlements." Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Ac-
cess, 126 Harv L Rev 1471, 1472 n 1 (2013).
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shows they do in other industries.38 If working in a smoking es-
tablishment is like working in high-rise construction or a nucle-
ar power plant, one must be paid extra in return for the health
risks one accepts. Second, consumers who dislike smoking may
patronize nonsmoking bars or other establishments. Smoking-
averse consumers will presumably require some compensation
for patronizing a smoking establishment, such as better prices
or superior service.
The argument works best in competitive markets such as
motels, restaurants, and bars. It works less well for less compet-
itive facilities such as airports and stadia, which often form local
monopolies. With competition, the standard prediction is that
the market will eventually produce a range of smoking policies
to reflect consumer tastes.39 Left alone, establishments might
eventually innovate by using sophisticated filtering technology
to create separate spaces for each type or by charging customers
for smoking (passing savings on to nonsmokers by charging less
for other goods and services). Nonsmokers who care strongly
about avoiding exposure to secondhand smoke will find restau-
rants and bars that cater to their preferences. Smokers who care
strongly about smoking in a particular establishment will find
the same. We observe this kind of differentiation in hotel rooms,
in that hotels reserve some rooms for nonsmokers and some ho-
tels choose to be entirely smoke-free.40 There was not much evi-
dence of nonsmoking bars or restaurants before the bans went
into effect, but arguably that kind of specialization would have
occurred on its own, in response to changing preferences, had
the law not intervened.
Thus, the libertarian argument against a smoking ban is
that, if establishments are free to decide whether to permit
38 See Lambert, 29 Regulation at 35-36 (cited in note 8) ("[E]mployers do in fact
pay a premium for exposing their workers to risks [such as secondhand smoking]."); Rob-
ert D. Tollison and Richard E. Wagner, The Economics of Smoking 138 (Kluwer 1992)
(describing the process by which nonsmokers demand wage premiums). See also general-
ly W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and Safety in the Workplace 37-58
(Harvard 1983) (discussing compensating wage differentials by which employees in risk-
ier jobs are paid more); W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical
Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates throughout the World, 27 J Risk & Uncer-
tainty 5 (2003) (reviewing the accumulated literature on compensating wage differen-
tials for risk).
39 See Lambert, 29 Regulation at 40 (cited in note 8).
40 See, for example, Millennium Hotels & Resorts, Millennium Knickerbocker Hotel
Chicago, online at http://www.millenniumhotels.com/millenniumchicago/hotel-amenities
/guest-services.html (visited Mar 2, 2014) (100 percent nonsmoking hotel).
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smoking, competitive markets supply the one and only distribu-
tion of smoking and nonsmoking establishments that is con-
sistent with consumer preferences and budgets.41 Note that this
efficiency argument is abstract and structural. There is no effort
to estimate each of the many costs and benefits of the pre-ban
smoking equilibrium and then to compare them to the costs and
benefits of a different outcome the law imposes. Instead, the
claim is that the pre-ban outcome is most likely to be efficient,
given that the structure of competitive markets and free ex-
change produces the optimal outcome. 42
The libertarian critic can go one step further. The argument
so far has been about simple efficiency-the maximization of
wealth. Yet, in this context, it is plausible that free market ex-
change maximizes not only wealth, but also welfare. A social
welfare function can be sensitive to distribution,43 yet nonsmok-
ers in the United States (at least) tend to be more affluent than
smokers. 44 The implications of this observation are significant
and easily overlooked. One cannot explain the fact that estab-
lishments overwhelmingly permitted smoking (before a ban) by
the relative wealth of smokers. Instead, the fact that many es-
tablishments chose to permit smoking implies that the poorer
smokers outbid the wealthier nonsmokers only because the for-
mer's preferences for smoking are more intense than the latter's
aversion to smoking (even considering the latter's concern about
their own health). Distributional concerns are ordinarily
thought to justify laws that promote the welfare of the less well-
off at the expense of the more well-off, not the other way around.
41 There is, of course, a separate strand of libertarianism according to which it is
only freedom of choice that matters, not whether a given arrangement will actually max-
imize welfare. That strand of thinking would oppose any smoking ban for the simple fact
that it restricts individual choice, irrespective of the consequences. We focus primarily on
the consequentialist strand of libertarianism, which we believe to be dominant.
42 See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U Pa L Rev 1643, 1655-57 (1996)
(describing a structural argument for courts to use in identifying whether business cus-
toms are likely to be efficient and worthy of enforcement).
43 See generally Matthew D. Adler, Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-
Benefit Analysis 307 (Oxford 2012) (arguing for a continuous prioritarianism that gives
additional weight to the welfare of the least well off); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell,
Fairness versus Welfare 28-38 (Harvard 2002) (noting that a social welfare function need
not be utilitarian but can give weight to equality of welfare).
44 See Phillip B. Levine, Tara A. Gustafson, and Ann D. Velenchik, More Bad News
for Smokers? The Effects of Cigarette Smoking on Wages, 50 Indust & Labor Rel Rev 493,
495, 500-08 (1997) (noting educational level disparities between smokers and nonsmok-
ers and showing smoker and nonsmoker wage differences).
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There are, of course, paternalistic arguments that the smokers
are making an error about their own interests (or that satisfac-
tion of uninformed preferences do not count in the social welfare
function)45, but the goal of this Article is to illustrate a different
critique, one that avoids this maximally paternalistic move.
Figure 1 illustrates the libertarian analysis. In this context,
an equilibrium refers to a percentage of smoking and nonsmok-
ing establishments (restaurants, bars, motels, etc.) that is stable
because no establishment gains by switching by itself from its
current state (smoking or nonsmoking) to the opposite state. The
x-axis is the percentage of establishments of this type (restau-
rants, bars, casinos, etc.) that permit smoking. The y-axis is the
net revenue of an establishment. The gray line shows the reve-
nue from operating an establishment that permits smoking,
which varies with the percentage of all establishments of the
same type that permit smoking. At the left, there are no other
smoking establishments, so the revenue for being the one smok-
ing establishment is high. At the far right, with the maximum
number of smoking competitors, revenue is at its lowest. The
curve might be drawn to decline continuously or, as here, to
have a flat middle segment where the revenues for one smoking
establishment are insensitive to the number of other smoking
establishments.
The black curve shows the revenues for nonsmoking estab-
lishments of the same sort. The shape and relative location of
the curve reveal two assumptions. One is that, in this communi-
ty, smokers are willing to pay more for the opportunity to smoke
in such establishments than nonsmokers are willing to pay for
the opportunity to be in a smoke-free establishment. That is why
the nonsmoking revenue curve is usually lower than the smok-
ing revenue curve. Yet, second, there comes a point where the
percentage of smoking establishments is so high that there is a
niche nonsmoking market in which the remaining establish-
ments earn more net revenue by attracting a large percentage of
the nonsmokers.
45 See, for example, Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-
Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J Legal Stud 1105, 1128-33 (2000)
(defending a welfarist cost-benefit analysis that values the satisfaction of undistorted
rather than actual preferences by imagining what preferences would be if individuals
were fully informed).
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FIGURE 1. A SINGLE EQUILIBRIUM OF SMOKING
ESTABLISHMENTS
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Where these curves intersect, the revenue from operating a
smoking establishment is equal to the revenue from operating a
nonsmoking establishment. This point is an equilibrium be-
cause, from there, no smoking establishment can gain by switch-
ing to nonsmoking and no nonsmoking bar can gain by switching
to smoking. From this point, if a smoking establishment became
nonsmoking, its choice would cause a decline in the percentage
of establishments permitting smoking and, therefore, its reve-
nue is represented by a point to the left of the intersection along
the black line. That part of the line is below the intersection,
meaning the establishment would lose money by switching to
nonsmoking. A similar point is true of a nonsmoking establish-
ment that changes to smoking: the increase in the percentage of
smoking establishments means that its revenue is represented
by a point to the right of the intersection along the gray curve.
That too is a move downward from the intersection, representing
a loss in revenues.
The intersection is the only equilibrium because, at every
other point along the x-axis, some establishment wants to switch
its smoking policy. To the left of the equilibrium, there is always
room for some establishment to increase revenue by switching
from nonsmoking to smoking. To the right of the equilibrium,
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there is always room for some establishment to increase revenue
by switching from smoking to nonsmoking. As drawn, Figure 1
shows an equilibrium with a relatively high percentage of smok-
ing establishments (more than 80 percent). The structural ar-
gument for the efficiency of this outcome is that it is the only
possible product of free exchange.
B. The Path-Dependence Critique of the Libertarian Argument
From an economic perspective, the libertarian is almost cer-
tainly correct in saying that the optimal amount of smoking es-
tablishments in any community is greater than zero. We might
say the same about any risky activity that adults choose to en-
gage in. There are health costs to skydiving, boxing, driving in
bad weather, eating cheeseburgers, and working high-rise con-
struction, but for some individuals the benefits outweigh those
costs.
Yet it is quite possible that the libertarian is wrong about
the status quo representing the only equilibrium. Instead, there
are many reasons to expect path dependence, which complicates
the case for efficiency. The multiple-equilibrium argument says
that the equilibrium we observed before smoking bans went into
effect was not the only equilibrium that could exist under that
legal regime. Instead, it was influenced by the starting point:
high rates of smoking, little concern about the health hazards of
secondhand smoke, and a social norm of deferring to smokers.
Had we instead started from a low rate of smoking, strong con-
cerns about passive smoking health hazards, and a norm of de-
ferring to nonsmokers, we might have reached a different equi-
librium, with more nonsmoking establishments. Importantly,
the argument assumes we are holding constant preferences
about smoking. The multiple-equilibrium argument is that those
preferences can produce different equilibrium behaviors. There
is therefore no reason to assume that the one we observe is effi-
cient.
Figure 2 illustrates. As before, the curves represent the net
revenue from operating a smoking or nonsmoking establish-
ment, which varies by the percentage of other establishments
that are smoking. The revenue curves here, however, cross not
once but three times. The intersection on the left is a low-
smoking equilibrium (LSE); the intersection on the right is a
high-smoking equilibrium (HSE); the middle intersection is not
an equilibrium.
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FIGURE 2. MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA OF SMOKING ESTABLISHMENTS
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First, let us verify that the intersections on the left and
right are in fact equilibria. The LSE on the left is an equilibrium
because, at this point, no smoking establishment can gain by
switching to nonsmoking and no nonsmoking bar can gain by
switching to smoking. If a smoking establishment became non-
smoking, its choice would cause a decline in the percentage of
establishments permitting smoking and therefore its revenue is
represented by a point to the left of the intersection along the
black line. The line is falling at that point, so the switch causes
revenue to decline. If a nonsmoking establishment switched to
smoking, it would move to the right on the gray line, which also
lowers revenue. For the same reason, the HSE on the right is an
equilibrium.
Now consider why no other point on the graph is an equilib-
rium. At any point on the x-axis where one revenue curve is
higher than the other, firms on the lower curve want to switch
their smoking policy in order to increase their revenues. To the
left of the LSE, the revenue of smoking establishments is higher,
so some establishments want to shift to smoking. To the right of
the HSE, the opposite is true-nonsmoking revenue is higher
and some establishments want to shift to nonsmoking.
What about that third intersection, the one in the middle?
For convenience, we will refer to this intersection as an "inflection
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point" (even though there is more than one inflection point in
Figure 2).46 This point lacks the stability of an equilibrium be-
cause any move away from it increases revenue: a switch to
smoking moves to the right on the gray curve, which is an up-
ward move; a switch to nonsmoking moves to the left and up on
the black curve. The significance of the inflection point is that it
represents the border between the attractive forces of the two
equilibria. If the initial distribution of establishments is to the
left of the inflection point, firms gain from switching to non-
smoking and the establishment owners will switch smoking pol-
icies until they reach the LSE. If the initial distribution is to the
right of the inflection point, the establishments move to the
HSE. (At the inflection point, either move is equally possible.)
Note the resulting path dependence. If the distribution of
establishments begins just slightly to the left of the inflection
point, the result is the LSE. If the initial distribution is just
slightly to the right of the inflection point, the result is the HSE.
Where we end up depends on arbitrary differences in where we
start. Yet if free exchange produces both the LSE and HSE, then
we can no longer rely on the structural argument for efficiency.
That the status quo is the product of free exchange is no longer
evidence of its efficiency, given that there is a very different out-
come that free exchange could just as easily produce, given an
arbitrarily different starting point.
The fact that the LSE exists also does not prove it is effi-
cient. To choose between the two equilibria requires some inde-
pendent normative evaluation. But note that the existence of
multiple equilibria invalidates the structural argument for the
efficiency of the current outcome because we cannot say the cur-
rent level of smoking-permitted establishments is the necessary
outcome of individuals freely pursuing their own ends. Instead,
those preferences and opportunities are consistent with more
than one behavioral outcome. Because we happened to start out
at a high smoking rate and higher tolerance rate for smoking,
we end up with something close to that.
Once there is no structural reason to favor the HSE, it is
easy to imagine a series of normative arguments for the LSE.
Perhaps the internalization of smoking externalities is never
perfect, as some smoke escapes the confines of one space into an
46 This is not necessarily the precise mathematical usage, but it captures the idea.
One might also call this intersection the "tipping point."
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adjoining "no-smoking" place, where people have not consented
to being exposed. If so, there is less such 'leakage" with an LSE
than an HSE. Perhaps the LSE causes more smokers to volun-
tarily quit, 47 which desirably reduces externalities a competitive
market doesn't address, such as the littering of discarded butts,
the spread of fires caused by smoking, or the choice of parents to
smoke around their children. There might be no economic-
efficiency or welfare basis for choosing between the two equilib-
ria, in which case it is difficult to object to using some other cri-
terion or criteria at least as a tiebreaker, and noneconomic crite-
ria might favor the LSE. Perhaps Aristotelian virtue ethics or
the "capabilities approach" opposes any consumption that ap-
proaches or constitutes an addiction, regardless of other conse-
quences.48 This Article is not attempting to contribute to any
such normative analysis, but only to note that once there are
multiple equilibria, there could be good normative reasons to
prefer some outcome other than the status quo.
Thus, if the LSE is superior to the HSE, note the implica-
tions for law. First, as observed in the Introduction, if we had
enough information to identify the location of the LSE, we could
use law to reach it directly by licensing the number of smoking
establishments the LSE represents. We can now add a similar
observation about the inflection point. If we have enough infor-
mation to identify the location of this dividing line, we would not
need to know where the LSE is in order to ensure its emergence.
As long as the law drives the percentage of smoking establish-
ments down to a level below (to the left of) the inflection point,
more establishments will choose to disallow smoking until the
percentage reaches the LSE.
Yet if we do not know with confidence where the LSE or the
inflection point is, then a permanent law may misfire. One risk
is that the government licenses too many smoking establish-
ments, at some level to the right of the inflection point (but to
the left of the HSE). The law thus seeks to impose a nonequilib-
rium number of smoking establishments by prohibiting smoking
in establishments that lack a license. There are two costs. First,
47 See Hersch, 31 J Risk & Uncertainty at 18-20 (cited in note 27); Anger, Kvas-
nicka, and Siedler, 30 J Health Econ at 593-97 (cited in note 27).
48 See generally Colin Farrelly and Lawrence B. Solum, eds, Virtue Jurisprudence
(Palgrave 2008) (a collection of essays on aretaic theories of law); Martha C. Nussbaum,
Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge 2000) (articu-
lating and defending the promotion of human capabilities as a theory of distributive jus-
tice).
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we never reach the LSE. We permanently enshrine a number of
smoking establishments that is higher (or lower) than optimal.
Second, to impose a nonequilibrium outcome requires enforce-
ment and incurs the associated costs. At any point to the right of
the inflection point, but left of the HSE, there are nonsmoking
establishments that would gain revenue by allowing smoking, so
those without licenses will have a constant incentive to violate
the smoking ban. The costs of constant enforcement might make
this scheme worse than simply allowing the HSE, which in-
volves no enforcement costs.
The parallel risk to permanent law is that the government
licenses too few smoking establishments, at some level to the left
of the LSE. Again, by permanently enforcing a below-optimal
smoking level, society must incur two costs. One is the ineffi-
ciency of frustrating stronger preferences for smoking (as well as
the distribution of wealth away from poorer smokers). The other
cost is enforcement, since at any point to the left of the LSE,
there are nonsmoking establishments that would gain by allow-
ing smoking, so those without licenses have a constant incentive
to violate the ban.
As a result, there are key advantages to giving a smoking
law an expiration date. One is equilibrium location. Once the
law expires, establishments will switch to smoking up to the
LSE but not beyond it. A second advantage is reduced enforce-
ment costs because the LSE is self-sustaining; at this point, no
establishment owner gains from switching to a policy allowing
smoking. So we save on enforcement costs and we gain whatever
normative advantage the LSE might have over the HSE.
Temporality also offers equilibrium verification. There is
always some chance that we have made a fundamental mistake
because our information is erroneous and there is no LSE. If the
economic libertarian is correct and the HSE is the only and effi-
cient equilibrium, then when the law expires the establishments
will switch back to smoking up to the level of the HSE. We will
have avoided the costs of erroneously using law to impose an in-
efficient outcome. Indeed, when we said above that we might not
know where the LSE or inflection point is, this includes the case
in which we are confident where the LSE or inflection point
would be if they existed, but there is some possibility that they
do not exist. The expiration of the law completes the experiment
that reveals whether the LSE exists and, if so, where it is locat-
ed.
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Now we turn to the question we have postponed: Why would
there ever be path dependence and multiple smoking equilibria?
C. Rational and Behavioral Mechanisms Creating Path
Dependence
We do not claim to offer all the reasons for multiple equilib-
ria in the number of smoking/nonsmoking establishments. We
wish only to illustrate the plausibility of the argument so we can
illustrate the virtues of temporary law. We divide our discussion
into rational-choice explanations and behavioral explanations
for path dependence. We focus on the example of bars, but most
of the points we make could apply to apartments, restaurants,
theatres, or other venues. Smoking bans are an obvious example
because, until recently, nearly every legal jurisdiction allowed
smoking in bars,49 and more importantly none had previously
banned smoking.O
1. Rational-choice mechanisms for path dependence in the
number of smoking establishments.
If individuals are rational, why would path dependence oc-
cur? A mundane story is the transition cost involved in switch-
ing smoking policies. When a bar goes from smoking to non-
smoking, the owner must put up signs, create an outdoor space
for smokers, and train the staff while replacing staff members
who quit on account of the new rules. The owner might also have
to spend money advertising for new customers. The immediate
costs of switching might exceed the discounted stream of higher
revenue from switching. For that reason, the switch is not effi-
cient, even if, absent switching costs, the bar would generate
gains in social welfare by being nonsmoking. For the rest of our
examples, a switch might be efficient.
Of greater interest are network effects.51 The story here has
to be that for one establishment, adopting a nonsmoking policy
alone will cause it to lose more customers than it gains, even
49 Patrick Kabat, "Till Naught but Ash Is Left to See": Statewide Smoking Bans,
Ballot Initiatives, and the Public Sphere, 9 Yale J Health Pol, L & Ethics 128, 133-36
(2009) (describing the emergence and proliferation of smoking bans).
50 Id at 133 ("Arizona passed the first statewide [secondhand smoking] legislation
in 1973, banning smoking in all indoor theaters, art museums, libraries, elevators, and
buses used by the public.").
51 For a review of the economic literature, see Farrell and Kiemperer, Coordination
and Lock-in at 1971-72 (cited in note 7).
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though if a group of establishments adopted the policy at the
same time they would gain more customers than they lost. But
why might it be true that the marginal smoking bar would not
gain from going nonsmoking if there is an equilibrium with
many more nonsmoking bars?
There are two kinds of social interdependencies that render
this outcome plausible. First is the lumpiness of consumption
represented by barhopping.52 Suppose there is a twenty-
something crowd that craves variety and therefore enjoys start-
ing at one bar and moving through three or four more over the
course of a night. Suppose also that there is currently only one
nonsmoking bar in the geographic area with twenty bars. Final-
ly, let us suppose that one of the primary costs the nonsmokers
perceive from patronizing the smoking bar is that the smoke ex-
posure, by the end of the night, causes their clothes and hair to
smell bad.53 This is no small matter if one's coat or clothing re-
quires dry cleaning. But imagine that the cost of tobacco-smoke
exposure is not linear, but subject to a strong threshold effect:
after the first thirty minutes of exposure in a smoking bar, addi-
tional minutes of exposure add almost nothing to the bad smell.
Now consider the effect of the Marginal Bar (the economist's
favorite drinking establishment)54 switching from smoking to
nonsmoking. If a night of barhopping involves going to four or
five bars, then it will make no difference to nonsmokers that the
Marginal Bar becomes nonsmoking. Even if they patronize both
of the two nonsmoking bars, they will go to two or three smoking
bars and still come home with the bad smell. Thus, the non-
smoking feature attracts no more nonsmoking barhoppers, but it
does drive away all the smoking barhoppers. The Marginal Bar
would not want to make that switch by itself.
52 It is difficult to estimate how common barhopping or pub crawling is. There is a
Guinness World Record for it. See Guinness Book of World Records, Most People on a
Pub Crawl (2013), online at http://www.guinnessworldrecords.comlrecords-3000/most-people
-on-a-pub-crawl (visited Mar 2, 2014).
53 See David B. Ezra, Smoker Battery: An Antidote to Second-Hand Smoke, 63 S Cal
L Rev 1061, 1093 (1990):
The clothing of a person who is exposed to tobacco smoke for even relatively
short periods of time can absorb chemicals that produce a foul odor that will
accompany that person for the remainder of the day. The only cure is to laun-
der the clothing, shower, and wash the hair.
54 There is in fact a bar with this name located in Portugal. See Marginal Bar,
online at https://www.facebook.comlMarginalBar (visited Mar 2, 2014).
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Nevertheless, there could also be a low-smoking equilibri-
um, one with, say, ten (of the twenty) bars being nonsmoking.
With that many nonsmoking bars, the nonsmokers could at the
same time satisfy their desire for barhopping and their desire to
avoid the bad smell of smoke exposure. Suppose the Marginal
Bar is one of the ten nonsmoking bars. If it switches from non-
smoking to smoking, it will gain just a few of the smoking bar
hoppers (now spread out over eleven bars) but lose all the non-
smoking bar hoppers. The Marginal Bar would not want to
make that switch by itself.55
Now consider a second network-effects story: social sorting.
Imagine that people go to only one bar per night, but that they
go with or meet up with a group of friends and acquaintances,
perhaps from work. When nineteen of the twenty bars are smok-
ing, the groups that form contain smokers and nonsmokers.
There being so few options for nonsmoking bars, the nonsmokers
feel it would be too demanding to ask everyone to meet at that
one nonsmoking bar and therefore the smokers always select a
smoking bar. The Marginal Bar realizes that nothing significant
will change if it becomes the second nonsmoking bar. The non-
smokers will still feel that there are so few choices of nonsmok-
ing bars that it would be unreasonable to insist on going to one
of them. The Marginal Bar will therefore not make the change
by itself.
Nonetheless, there could be a low-smoking equilibrium
where ten of the twenty bars are nonsmoking. With half the bars
nonsmoking, requesting to meet at a nonsmoking bar is no more
constraining than requesting to meet at a smoking bar. Thus,
the nonsmokers will speak up. There are three ways the low-
smoking equilibrium might then be stable. One is that the group
bargains over what kind of bar to patronize and the nonsmoking
bar wins a substantial fraction of the time. Perhaps the group
alternates evenly between the smoking and nonsmoking bars.
We have said nothing up to this point about what proportion of
the group is nonsmoking. But we might think that if the majority
55 If transaction costs were sufficiently low, a group of bars might contract with
each other to jointly switch to nonsmoking. But various transactions costs might block
this solution. First, there are costs of coordinating among the different owners and each
owner might seek to avoid these costs by waiting for another owner to take the lead in
coordinating them. Second, the bar owners might themselves lack the information to
know the location of the other equilibrium, that is, how many bars need to jointly switch
to achieve the joint gains. Third, there could be concerns about antitrust liability from
competitors agreeing jointly to the terms offered to customers.
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of the group is nonsmoking, then it will patronize nonsmoking
bars most or all of the time. A second possibility is that the
group breaks up. Now that there is substantial choice, the dif-
ference between smokers and nonsmokers is sufficient to cause
the work groups to form around that choice. The nonsmokers
now always patronize nonsmoking bars. If we allow even more
endogeneity, we arrive at a third possibility: some of the smok-
ers find that the inconvenience of exiting the group or suffering
in a nonsmoking bar is sufficient to cause them to quit smok-
ing.56 This point reinforces the first two-increasing the bargain-
ing power of the nonsmokers to either spend more time in the
nonsmoking bar or to stop inviting smokers to join them.
There might be other network-effect mechanisms as well,
such as the effects of such policies on the labor supply of bar-
tenders and other bar employees. A nonsmoking policy is costly
for employees who smoke. Most obviously, some nonsmoking
policies require employees to exit the building to smoke rather
than to smoke in a designated room (out of fear that air circula-
tion will then drive away nonsmoking customers). Requiring
employees to smoke outside imposes costs when the weather is
unpleasant or when the nearest smoking spot is next to the gar-
bage bin or in a poorly lit alley. Even if the nonsmoking estab-
lishment allows smoking employees to smoke inside, they may
impose limits on where the smoking may occur, perhaps limited
to time in the break room, rather than allowing a waiter or bar-
tender to keep a lit cigarette in an ashtray accessible to the
workspace.
Now consider how employees will sort themselves. If we
start with all bars allowing smoking, then employee smokers
will have no reason to avoid working at bars. By contrast, non-
smoker workers will disproportionately sort themselves into jobs
other than at bars. The nonsmoker who works in his own home
need not be exposed to smoke. One who works outside as a gar-
dener, door-to-door salesperson, or sidewalk vendor will not
have to worry about intense exposure. One who drives a cab can
usually decide to forbid smoking in the cab. And almost any fac-
tory or office building will have less intense buildup of smoke
than a bar, pool hall, or dance club. The point is that, when all
establishments permit smoking, the nonsmokers will not be
56 See note 27 and accompanying text.
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spread evenly but will be concentrated in those industries with
less intense smoke exposure.
Suppose also that the labor supply is "sticky" in the short
run because those who are already have a job working in a bar
have lower search costs for other bar jobs than those who are
currently working in another occupation. That is not to say that
the labor market for bar workers is fixed; some people might
move from nonbar jobs to bar jobs. But given two workers of
equal marginal productivity at serving alcohol, the one already
employed in this occupation is more likely to apply for desirable
positions in the occupation. This might be true for various rea-
sons, the simplest being information: those working in other oc-
cupations are less likely to have the information about the best
available bar jobs, so that they are less likely to apply. Another
is human-capital investments: when all or most bars are smok-
ing, the people who take bartending classes (learning to mix
drinks) are more likely to be smokers.
Finally, assume that a bar experiences lower wage costs the
larger the pool of potential applicants for an offered job. If there
are five applicants for every job, instead of two, the employer
will either be able to pay a lower wage or to hire a more produc-
tive worker.
Given these points, there will be network effects. If almost
all bars are smoking, employee selection means that the average
bar will have lots of smoking employees and, when there is
turnover, will be able to draw on a labor pool that has many
smokers (in both cases, compared to the percentage of smokers
in the general working population). If all the bars are nonsmok-
ing, selection works the opposite way so that the average bar
will have relatively more nonsmoking employees and job appli-
cants. In either case, the effect in the short run is to raise the
labor costs of operating against the industry standard. With all
smoking bars, if the Marginal Bar switches to nonsmoking, it
will not only incur switching costs, it will draw on a smaller pool
of potential employees than its competitors, which will raise its
labor costs. With all nonsmoking bars, if the Marginal Bar
switches to smoking, it will incur higher employee costs than its
competitors.
In short, it is not difficult to imagine network effects impact-
ing the decisions of bar owners regarding smoking policies. The
result is multiple equilibria, with path dependence affecting the
equilibrium that actually emerges. The point is general and
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applies outside the context of smoking bans. It is well known in
game theory that collective action and coordination games can
create multiple equilibria, but we will attempt to illustrate the
point with some specificity. Imagine a neighborhood with local
amenities (a nice park, some good restaurants) but also a sub-
stantial crime problem. Relatively few people visit the neighbor-
hood after dark, and this allows criminals to target the few peo-
ple who venture there with relative impunity. The neighborhood
is in an inefficient low-traffic equilibrium. If the number of peo-
ple frequenting the neighborhood after dark increased substan-
tially, the streets would be crowded and criminals could no long-
er operate. This would be a high-traffic equilibrium. However,
no individual would rationally begin frequenting the neighbor-
hood without knowing that others will as well. If the costs of co-
ordination are high, the neighborhood will remain in the low-
traffic equilibrium. And if the neighborhood were able to transi-
tion to the high-traffic equilibrium, that equilibrium might be
stable as well. If the number of people who frequent the neigh-
borhood is substantially greater than the number necessary to
deter criminals, no individual will have a rational reason to
change behavior, so long as the neighborhood remains a desira-
ble destination.
Signaling mechanisms can also create multiple stable equi-
libria. One canonical example is seat belt use.57 In a society in
which almost no one wears a seat belt, the social meaning of a
passenger's buckling up is to insult the driver. Using a safety
device that no one else uses signals a belief that the driver is in-
competent. Drivers who use a seat belt signal to passengers that
they know themselves to be bad drivers. Either signal raises the
costs of wearing a seatbelt, which helps to sustain a low-use
equilibrium. By contrast, if almost everyone in society uses a
seat belt, the use is no longer insulting. The passenger does not
signal distrust of the current driver, nor does the driver signal
doubts of his own competence, merely by using a safety precau-
tion almost everyone uses. The lower costs of this social meaning
can sustain a high-use equilibrium.
57 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U Chi L Rev 943, 952
(1995) (describing the social meaning of putting on a seat belt in a Budapest taxi).
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2. Behavioral mechanisms for path dependence in the
number of smoking establishments.
Now we turn from network externalities to behavioral bias-
es. Returning to the smoking example, we consider biases that
might affect three different groups: bar owners, employees, and
customers.
When a bar owner is considering whether to switch from al-
lowing smoking to prohibiting it (or the reverse), that owner will
necessarily weigh the current customers she will lose if she
switches against the hypothetical future customers she might
gain. However, as noted above, the bar owner will likely suffer
from the availability heuristic. 5s The customers that will be lost
are psychologically available because they are current custom-
ers-the bar owner sees them and may even know them person-
ally. The customers who might be gained from the switch are not
available; by definition, they never (or rarely) set foot in the bar.
The availability heuristic is the tendency to overestimate the
numbers of things (or people) that are psychologically available
and underestimate the numbers of things that are not.59 So bar
owners will likely overestimate the number of customers they
will lose from switching and underestimate the number of cus-
tomers they might gain. As with most biases, changing the sta-
tus quo would reverse the direction of the bias. If a bar were al-
ready nonsmoking, current (nonsmoking) customers would be
more available than potential smoking customers, and bar own-
ers would overestimate the costs of switching to allow smoking.
The same effect might be triggered by risk aversion or loss
aversion, which is the tendency to fear losses more than one
values gains.60 Switching from permitting to prohibiting smok-
ing would involve possible gains and losses of customers, and a
typical bar owner would likely fear losing current customers
more than she would value the prospect of gaining additional
ones. But once a bar has become nonsmoking, the owner would
58 See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 Cognitive Psychology 207, 208-09 (1973) (describing the
availability heuristic).
59 Id at 228-30 (explaining how the availability heuristic can arise).
60 See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J Econ Persp 193, 199-203
(Winter 1991) (describing the endowment effect and loss aversion); Steffen Huck, Georg
Kirchsteiger, and Jorg Oechssler, Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the En-
dowment Effect, 115 Econ J 689, 699-700 (2005) (offering an evolutionary theory of the
endowment effect).
20141
The University of Chicago Law Review
view a switch back to allowing smoking as bringing possible
losses to which she is again averse. 61
Present bias or hyperbolic discounting on the part of a bar
owner could equally cause a stable but suboptimal equilibrium
to develop. Recall that there are immediate costs in switching
from smoking to nonsmoking, even if there are eventual net
gains. A bar owner might want to put up signs, create an out-
door space for smokers, spend money advertising for new non-
smoking customers, and retrain new employees as smoking em-
ployees quit in anticipation of the new rule. A large body of
economic literature shows that, when faced with decisions of this
nature, with immediate costs and future benefits, many people
procrastinate.62 That is, even though the benefits discounted by
their ordinary discount rate (the one they use when comparing
the costs or benefits of two future events) exceed the costs, the
immediate costs loom larger, as the future was discounted at an
inconsistently high rate when compared to an immediate cost.
As a result, bar owners keep delaying the costly investment,
even though they will not regret the investment if they make it.
If an owner is "present biased" in this sense, he or she will post-
pone investing in a profitable switch to nonsmoking status, but
will not switch back once the investment is made.
Finally, a bar owner might also fall prey to the sunk cost fal-
lacy: the desire not to "waste" resources that have already been
spent even if it would be in the individual's interests to do s0. 63
61 Deborah A. Kermer, et al, Loss Aversion Is an Affective Forecasting Error, 17
Psychological Sci 649, 652 (2006) (positing a mechanism for loss aversion).
62 See generally, for example, Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein, and Ted
O'Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J Econ Lit
351 (2002) (reviewing the economic literature on self-control problems); David Laibson,
Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q J Econ 443 (1997) (modeling time-
inconsistent preferences and imperfect financial self-control technologies); Ted
O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 Am Econ Rev 103 (1999)
(modeling time-inconsistent, present-biased preferences, with people who are aware or
unaware of their bias). For discussions of how bounded self-control matters to law, see
generally Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower and Legal Policy, 5 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 91
(2009) (reviewing the economic literature and its significance for law); Richard H. McAd-
ams, Present Bias and Criminal Law, 2011 U II L Rev 1607 (examining the relevance of
present bias to the structure of criminal law and sanctions); Manuel A. Utset, Procrasti-
nation and the Law, in Chrisoula Andreou and Mark D. White, eds, The Thief of Time:
Philosophical Essays on Procrastination 253 (Oxford 2010) (identifying how law can aid
or impede the self-control efforts of present-biased individuals).
63 See Susan Block-Lieb and Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower:
Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform" of Bankruptcy Law, 84 Tex L
Rev 1481, 1534 (2006) ("Cognitive research also finds that individuals are reluctant to
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For instance, a bar owner might have made smoking-specific in-
vestments, such as installing a high-quality ventilation system
or purchasing ashtrays or a cigarette vending machine. Going
smoke-free would mean wasting these resources. This is yet an-
other mechanism by which a bar owner can become tied to the
status quo long past the point at which it ceases to be to her ad-
vantage.
Employees might also suffer from relevant cognitive biases.
Perhaps most important is the endowment effect, which is the
human tendency to overvalue the things (including rights and
privileges) that one already possesses. 64 When an employee can
smoke at work, the entitlement to smoke seems more valuable
than it would if the employee were not allowed to smoke at
work. This will cause smokers to care a great deal if their work-
places transition from smoking to smoke-free-more than they
would care about transitions in the opposite direction, in which
nonsmoking workplaces (where workers are not already en-
dowed with the right to smoke) begin to allow smoking. The re-
verse is also true. Nonsmokers would place a higher value on
holding onto a smoke-free workplace than transitioning from a
smoking workplace to a smoke-free one. This means that work-
ers will fight harder to hold onto whatever arrangement is cur-
rently in place. Employers who switch from smoking to non-
smoking or the reverse will incur significant costs, either losing
employees or being forced to compensate them for the change.65
The result will be to entrench the status quo.
Lastly, customers might also be subject to cognitive biases
in favor of the status quo that could lead to multiple equilibria.
Consider first the problem of affective forecasting. Humans have
notorious difficulty at predicting how they much they will enjoy
a given experience or circumstance.66 Imagine then that we are
walk away from sunk costs, irrationally ignoring the marginal costs and benefits of addi-
tional action.").
64 See Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 5 J Econ Persp at 194-99 (cited in note 60)
(describing and identifying the endowment effect).
65 See Frank Radosevich II, No Butts about It: Urbana, Ill., Adopts Smoking Ordi-
nance, Daily Illini (Aug 2, 2006) (quoting waitress as saying "employees have been tak-
ing it worse than customers" after the imposition of the smoking ban). See also Interview
22 (May 2, 2007) (on file with authors) (employee turnover after smoking ban).
66 See Timothy D. Wilson and Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting: Knowing
What to Want, 14 Current Directions Psychological Sci 131, 131 (2005) ("Research on af-
fective forecasting has shown that people routinely mispredict how much pleasure or dis-
pleasure future events will bring and, as a result, sometimes work to bring about events
that do not maximize their happiness."); David A. Schkade and Daniel Kahneman, Does
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in a high-smoking equilibrium, with nearly 100 percent of bars
permitting smoking. Nonsmokers might not realize how much
they would enjoy going to smoke-free bars. As a result, they
might not agitate for nonsmoking bars either publicly-by ask-
ing bar owners to ban smoking-or privately, by urging their
friends to join them at the few nonsmoking bars. Bar owners
will thus perceive the benefits of switching to be lower than they
actually are.67
Similarly, humans have a remarkable capacity to adapt to
new circumstances and conditions, even highly unpleasant ones.
Exposing an individual to new circumstances might initially
make her quite unhappy, but over time she might learn to ac-
cept or even prefer those circumstances. Psychologists describe
the process as hedonic adaptation.68
The power of these psychological mechanisms to produce
multiple equilibria should be clear. In a high-smoking equilibri-
um, nonsmoking customers and employees could adapt to the
presence of smoke. This would dull or eliminate their desire to
seek out nonsmoking alternatives, which would in turn diminish
the incentives of business owners to prohibit smoking. And the
reverse is possible as well-smokers in a low-smoking equilibri-
um might adapt to being unable to smoke.69
Adaptation could then serve to entrench whatever status
quo is generated by a temporary ban as well. If a jurisdiction
enacts a temporary smoking ban, nonsmokers will have the op-
portunity to experience nonsmoking bars and might realize how
much nicer it is to spend time in a nonsmoking establishment.
Their adaptation to smokiness might dissipate. The costs of ac-
companying their smoking friends to a smoking bar would seem
Living in California Make People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satis-
faction, 9 Psychological Sci 340, 345 (1998) (discussing affective forecasting errors).
67 See Mike Monson, Bar Owners Urge Ban Exemption; Beverage Official Says Rule
Would Be 'Devastating,' The News Gazette Al (June 5, 2006) (quoting bar owner as say-
ing "it is a fiction that nonsmokers will replace the smokers who stop patronizing bars.").
68 For an excellent summary of the initial research on hedonic adaptation, see
Shane Frederick and George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in Daniel Kahneman, Ed
Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds, Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology
302, 311-20 (Russell Sage 1999).
69 We hasten to add that, if an equilibrium becomes entrenched because of hedonic
adaptation, this does not necessarily mean that the equilibrium is suboptimal. Adapta-
tion may represent a real welfare gain. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco,
and Jonathan S. Masur, Welfare as Happiness, 98 Georgetown L J 1583, 1605-10 (2010).
Accordingly, a low-smoking equilibrium to which smokers have adapted may be no worse
off for the smokers than a high-smoking equilibrium.
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higher. Importantly, people often do not remember how quickly
they were able to adapt in the past.70 Thus, the nonsmokers
might not realize that they will again adapt to a smoke-filled
environment. Once the temporary ban lapses, these nonsmokers
might continue to prefer bars that remain nonsmoking, creating
additional business for those bars and incentives for them to
continue to prohibit smoking.. This could lead to a new low-
smoking equilibrium.
The final mechanism is the simplest: the ban reduces the
number of smokers. Over the long term, smoking rates in the
United States are declining. 71 Smoking bans may accelerate that
trend because the inconvenience of not being able to smoke in a
bar (or other establishment) may cause individuals to quit smok-
ing (or to quit more quickly). Indeed, some smokers apparently
support bans for this very reason, as a self-commitment device
for quitting (which makes sense if smokers are subject to pre-
sent bias and otherwise procrastinate about quitting). So if the
ban lowers the number of smokers, it may change the profit
margins for being a nonsmoking establishment in a way that
supports an equilibrium with more such establishments after
the ban lapses.
In sum, there are a great many reasons to expect multiple
equilibria in the proportion of establishments permitting smok-
ing. If there are multiple equilibria, the structural argument
against smoking bans no longer exists, and there are plausible
reasons to prefer a low-smoking over a high-smoking equilibri-
um. Yet this rationale supports only a temporary law, which,
given uncertainty, has certain informational advantages over a
permanent law. We now turn to a generalization of this analysis.
II. THE ADVANTAGES (AND DISADVANTAGES) OF TEMPORARY LAW
Now we generalize the smoking-policy example. Temporary law
is a useful mechanism for discovering and unsettling suboptimal
70 See Timothy D. Wilson, et al, Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting, 78 J Personality & Soc Psychology 821, 833 (2000) (describing adaptation
and the human response to it).
71 See Bridgette E. Garrett, et al, Cigarette Smoking - United States, 1965-2008,
60 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Rpt Supplement 109, 110 (Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention Jan 14, 2011), online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/other/su6O0l.pdf
(visited Mar 2, 2014) (presenting data of smoking trends).
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equilibria. Temporary law provides a number of advantages over
the alternative of permanent law, which we now address: (1)
possible efficiency gains based on superior information, (2)
greater accommodation of the demands for liberty, and (3) a new
space for political compromise of competing claims. We also con-
sider the potential costs associated with temporary law.
A. Advantages
1. Efficiency (and information).
The main advantage of temporary law is the discovery of a
more efficient equilibrium, if there is one. After the law expires,
if the behavioral equilibrium remains the same or is otherwise
substantially different from the original equilibrium, we have
confirmed the existence of multiple equilibria. This is the pro-
cess we have termed "equilibrium verification and location." Bet-
ter information allows efficiency gains when the new equilibri-
um is welfare enhancing. Alternatively, after the law expires, if
the behavior reverts to the original equilibrium, the legislative
experiment reveals the case against path dependence and any
normative claim predicated on path dependence.
a) Information. At the most basic level, any type of law can
be information revealing.72 Before the law is enacted, there is
uncertainty as to what the effects of such a law would be.73 After
the law has been passed, policy makers can observe the new
state of the world and determine the law's effects. 74 In theory, af-
ter legalizing prostitution or the sale of heroin, one can observe
whether it causes the social ills associated with those activities
72 See Listokin, 118 Yale L J at 483 n 1 (cited in note 15) (describing the infor-
mation-revealing process of policy making as "learning").
73 Id ("Before implementing a policy, policymakers may have only a dim idea about
the effects of the policy.").
74 Id ("After implementing the policy and observing its effects, policymakers will
often have a much better sense of the outcomes associated with the policy in current and
future periods.").
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to rise or fall.75 One can observe whether a minimum wage in-
creases unemployment, as some theory predicts.76
What is unique about temporary law, however, is the infor-
mation revealed not (or not only) by the law's enactment-its
consequences when the law is in effect-but after the law lapses.
Policy makers and scholars generally assume that there is only
one possible equilibrium for each legal rule (with a given level of
enforcement).77 When this is the case, the expiration of a tempo-
rary law tends to return behavior to the status quo ante, so that
the expiration itself reveals no useful information. Of course,
Listokin directs our attention to the fact that some of the law's
effects are irreversible, 78 as the legalization of heroin might cre-
ate a new glut of addicts who do not immediately disappear
when the prohibition on heroin is reinstated. But even here, the
purpose of repeal is to stop the ill effects caused by the new law,
which means to respond to information produced by the enact-
ment of the new law, not its expiration.
Yet things are different when there are multiple equilibria.
If this is the case, temporary law can allow the policy maker to
observe the different equilibria that can exist under a single le-
gal regime. If the legal rule allows smoking in bars, there may
be one equilibrium in which 100 percent of bars allow smoking
75 See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Trafficking, Prostitution, and Inequality,
46 Harv CR-CL L Rev 271 (2011) (expounding on the social ills associated with prostitu-
tion). See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 Mich J Gender
& L 13, 13 (1993) ('"Women in prostitution are denied every imaginable civil right in eve-
ry imaginable and unimaginable way."); John Kaplan, A Primer on Heroin, 27 Stan L
Rev 801, 806-13 (1975) (describing heroin use and its effects).
76 Debra Burke, Stephen Miller, and Joseph Long, Minimum Wage and Unem-
ployment Rates: A Study of Contiguous Counties, 46 Gonzaga L Rev 661, 675-76 (2011)
(explaining the general theory that the minimum wage may adversely affect employ-
ment). See also David Neumark and William Wascher, Minimum Wages, Labor Market
Institutions, and Youth Employment: A Cross-National Analysis, 57 Indus & Lab Rel Rev
223, 243 (2004) (providing evidence that the minimum wage reduces employment rates
among the youth population).
77 William N. Eskridge Jr and Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv L Rev 26, 32 (1994).
78 Listokin, 118 Yale L J at 522 (cited in note 15). Compare William Rhodes, et al,
Illicit Drugs: Price Elasticity of Demand and Supply 12-25, 89-92 (Abt Associates 2001)
(collecting studies on price elasticity of demand for illegal drugs; finding weak negative
price elasticity for heroin) and Michael Grossman and Frank J. Chaloupka, The Demand
for Cocaine by Young Adults: A Rational Addiction Approach, 17 J Health Econ 427, 429
(1998) (collecting studies reporting negative price elasticity of demand for illegal drugs,
including heroin), with Mark A. Deininger, The Economics of Heroin: Key to Optimizing
the Legal Response, 10 Ga L Rev 565, 586 (1976) ("Because the addict is willing to pay
higher and higher prices for heroin, heroin enterprise remains profitable despite in-
creased criminalization.").
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and another equilibrium in which only 50 percent of bars allow
smoking. If the choice of equilibrium is path dependent, the
equilibrium that develops in response to a particular rule might
depend not only upon that legal rule, but in addition on the rule
that preceded it. The unique information temporary law reveals
is the behavior that results from the same regulation with dif-
ferent initial states.
Temporary law could effectively reveal situations of multi-
ple equilibria caused by any of the mechanisms we described in
Part I. Consider first the rational-choice mechanisms. If an equi-
librium exists purely because of switching costs, temporary law
will reveal a different equilibrium by forcing individuals to bear
those switching costs (though as we noted, if the costs of switch-
ing exceed the benefits, it is inefficient to switch). This is simi-
larly true if the equilibrium exists because of network effects. If,
for instance, it is unprofitable for a single bar to switch from
smoking to nonsmoking while other bars continue to allow
smoking, it may nonetheless be profitable for the bar to remain
nonsmoking if all the other bars around it are similarly made
nonsmoking by law.7M Likewise for coordination or signaling ef-
fects: if the existing equilibrium is entrenched because of coordi-
nation problems or a type of signal, a temporary law that solves
the coordination problem or reverses the signal would reveal an
alternative stable equilibrium. In Part IV, we will discuss the
types of temporary laws that might achieve this effect in the
contexts of crime or seat belt use, our examples from above.
The same conclusion also applies to all of the behavioral
mechanisms we described.80 If an equilibrium holds because ex-
isting customers are more available and salient than potential
future customers, temporarily changing the legal rule will bring
these potential (now actual) customers to the fore. They will be-
come at least as salient, if not more salient, than the customers
who existed under the old legal regime. If the equilibrium is be-
ing driven by loss aversion or risk aversion, temporary law will
simply force individuals and firms to accept the possibility of
loss or risk. They will then learn whether their aversion was jus-
tified. Temporary law will overcome the sunk cost fallacy in sim-
ilar fashion, forcing individuals to make changes that the sunk
79 But see John H. Miller and Scott E. Page, Complex Adaptive Systems: An Intro-
duction to Computational Models of Social Life 17-20 (Princeton 2007) (explaining how
the choice of a new status quo can reorganize individuals who are engaging in sorting).
80 See Part I.C.2.
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cost fallacy might have deterred. Temporary law also alters the
status quo, disrupting biases that depend on that status quo. If
an equilibrium has become entrenched because of the endow-
ment effect, temporary law will adjust the entitlement to which
individuals (both consumers and producers) have become accus-
tomed. Finally, if a particular equilibrium is due to adaptation
or affective-forecasting errors, temporary law will disrupt these
mechanisms as well. Individuals who have adapted to one state
of the world will find that status quo disrupted and be forced to
adapt (or not) to another. And individuals who feared moving
from the status quo because they incorrectly forecast that they
will be less well-off under a different set of rules will be forced to
experience that new set of rules. They will then learn whether
their forecast was correct and can adjust their beliefs if they
were mistaken.
We hasten to add that temporary law will not allow us to
distinguish between these network and behavioral mechanisms.
If a temporary smoking ban causes the vast majority of bars in a
jurisdiction to continue to prohibit smoking even after the ban is
lifted, we cannot know which of the equilibrium-entrenching
mechanisms we described was at work. It is possible that many
of them were operating in combination. This information would
certainly be valuable were it available, but it is not essential be-
fore we can draw policy conclusions. If temporary law creates a
new (post-repeal) equilibrium that differs greatly from the sta-
tus quo ante, that indicates that the prior equilibrium was due
to forces other than pure market supply and demand. The case
against regulation is thus weakened.81
In addition, a single temporary law can identify at most one
additional equilibrium.82 Imagine that before a smoking ban is
passed, 95 percent of all bars allow smoking (an HSE). A juris-
diction enacts a ban, which automatically lapses after two years.
Following the expiration of the temporary ban, the number of
bars permitting smoking rises from 0 percent to 20 percent (an
LSE). This does not foreclose the possibility that there is anoth-
er equilibrium located between the HSE and the LSE-for in-
stance, a medium-smoking equilibrium (MSE) at 40 percent. For
that matter, there could be dozens (or, theoretically, an infinite
81 See, for example, Sunstein and Thaler, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1161 (cited in note 1)
("[T]he design features of both legal and organizational rules have surprisingly powerful
influences on people's choices.").
82 We thank Haggai Porat for suggesting this point.
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number) of intermediate-smoking equilibria. One of these MSE
might be superior to both the LSE and the HSE.
If so, in order to discover the MSE, the jurisdiction must
pass yet another temporary law, one that creates a starting
point somewhere between the LSE and the HSE. For instance, it
might pass a law providing only enough licenses for 50 percent
of the bars in the jurisdiction to allow smoking. If that law laps-
es and the HSE reemerges, with 95 percent of bars allowing
smoking, then policy makers have learned that there is no equi-
librium between 50 percent smoking and 95 percent smoking.83
The jurisdiction could then conceivably pass yet another tempo-
rary law licensing 35 percent of bars in the jurisdiction to permit
smoking in an attempt to discover whether there is an equilibri-
um between 20 percent and 50 percent.8 4 Of course, the returns
to this exercise diminish quickly as the range of potential alter-
native equilibria shrinks. Policy makers will have to consider
carefully whether the search for additional equilibria justifies
the transition costs involved. (We will say more on this point be-
low.)
It is also important to distinguish the informational benefits
of temporary law from those of federalism. Federalism is often
described as information producing because it allows a policy
83 This conclusion is based upon the supposition that if an equilibrium existed be-
tween 50 percent and 95 percent, the population of bars would presumably have come to
rest at that equilibrium on its way upwards from 50 percent. Of course, one could imag-
ine that bar owners might play a type of mixed strategy, choosing randomly whether to
begin allowing smoking after the ban is lifted, and that thiey would all play it simultane-
ously rather than sequentially. If this is the case, then it is conceivable that the number
of bars allowing smoking could shoot past some intermediate equilibrium, all the way to
95 percent (or even 100 percent). This is analogous to the idea in statistical physics that
all of the air molecules in a room could randomly and spontaneously end up in one cor-
ner, suffocating all of the room's occupants. However, like this physics thought experi-
ment, we believe that the likelihood of such behavior is vanishingly small. To offer just
one reason: bar owners (and individuals more generally) do not all act perfectly simulta-
neously. They have the opportunity to observe one another's actions before choosing to
act. A belief in simultaneous behavior is the type of game-theoretic assumption that gen-
erates interesting results but is ultimately unrealistic. Regardless, we thank Tony Casey
and Barry Adler for suggesting this important point.
84 A reader might legitimately wonder what it would mean to "license" 35 percent
of bars to permit smoking in a jurisdiction in which only 20 percent of bars currently
want to permit smoking. In effect, such a law would license only 65 percent of bars to
ban smoking; other bars would be forced, as a condition of operation, to allow smoking.
Just as a jurisdiction could permit bars to operate only on the condition that they ban
smoking, it could permit bars to operate only on the condition that they allow smoking.
Accordingly, jurisdictions could move back and forth from low-smoking temporary laws
(such as a ban) to high-smoking temporary laws. This point is generalizable across all
types of temporary bans.
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maker to test one or more policies in smaller jurisdictions. 8-
State or local "laboratories" allow experiments at lower risks
than does national legislation.86 Temporary law also constrains
risk, but by parceling the new regulation across a subunit of
time rather than a subunit of space. Yet these two modes of di-
versifying regulatory risks are not substitutes. Federalism is not
a solution to problems of multiple equilibria. Local experiments
with permanent smoking bans do not reveal whether there was a
low-smoking equilibrium consistent with the rule permitting
smoking. But federalism and temporary law may be complemen-
tary. If a temporary law produces a new equilibrium, it will al-
ways be possible that some exogenous factor-for instance, the
revelation of new information about the dangers of smoking-
was responsible, and the temporary law had little to do with it.
One way of disambiguating these possible effects is to exper-
iment (via federalism) with temporary law in some jurisdictions
but not others. The proof of multiple equilibria in one jurisdic-
tion may make it more plausible (but not certain) that multiple
equilibria exist in another jurisdiction and that temporary law
can be used to arrive at a different equilibrium. By contrast, if
the expiration of temporary law in one jurisdiction results in
restoration of the original equilibrium, the proof of a single equi-
librium in one jurisdiction may make less plausible (but not rule
out with certainty) the presence of multiple equilibria in another
jurisdiction, decreasing the case for even temporary regulation.
b) Efficiency. Given more information, the efficiency ad-
vantage of a temporary law is error correction. The rationale for
the ban-multiple equilibria-may be based on an error. If the
law is effectively enforced, a powerful type of evidence is the
reemergence of the original equilibrium after the law expires.
85 See Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitu-
tional Rights, 152 U Pa L Rev 1745, 1745-52 (2004):
The most appealing reason for courts ... to preserve the role of autonomous
states is the prediction that states will ... experiment with new policies ...
and produc[e] evidence about the effectiveness and workability of new pro-
grams, to be followed ... by the rest of the states, who can look upon one
state's experiment and learn.
86 New State Ice Co v Liebmann, 285 US 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis dissenting) ("It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country."). See also Listokin, 118 Yale L J at 514 (cited in
note 15) (describing how jurisdictions can observe others' policy outcomes while avoiding
the negative effects of failure).
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Temporary law thus allows error correction of poor regulations,
providing efficiency advantages.
If expiration of the law does not cause behavior to revert to
the old equilibrium, the move to the newly discovered equilibri-
um may be an efficiency gain. As noted above, whether it is a
gain depends on some independent analysis, but the existence of
the new equilibrium undermines the structural argument for
the efficiency of the original equilibrium.7 How might we deter-
mine which equilibrium, low smoking or high smoking, is supe-
rior? Some alternative mechanism, such as a version of cost-
benefit analysis, will be necessary. 88 It is beyond the scope of this
Article to lay out an approach in full detail, but we will offer
some prudential guidance. First, we could measure the net reve-
nues of bars and restaurants at the old and new equilibria. If
net revenues have increased after the switch to the new equilib-
rium, this is evidence that both bar owners and customers prefer
the new equilibrium.89 Another means of getting at the same
question would be to measure the number of person-hours spent
in bars at the new and old equilibria. If bar customers were, col-
lectively, spending more time in bars at the new equilibrium, or
if more people were patronizing bars at that equilibrium, that
too would be evidence that the switch to the new equilibrium
has increased welfare by providing greater opportunities for bar
patrons.
These may be difficult quantities to measure, but there is
also a potential shortcut. The goal in searching out a new equi-
librium is to provide a greater range of options to customers-
that is, to better align supply with demand. If customers have
more options, it is more likely that they will find a bar that
meets their preferences and will patronize it. Generally speak-
ing, the more extreme the equilibrium, the fewer the options
available to customers. If 98 percent of all bars permit smoking,
very few customers will have a nonsmoking bar available to
them. If, on the other hand, "only" 55 percent of bars allow
87 See notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
88 See generally John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan S. Masur,
Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 Duke L J 1603 (2013).
89 See J~r6me Adda, Samuel Berlinski, and Stephen Machin, Market Regulation
and Firm Performance: The Case of Smoking Bans in the United Kingdom, 55 J L &
Econ 365, 374 (2012) (finding that bar revenues in Scotland decreased after a smoking
ban was implemented). Of course, this provides little information about the relative mer-
its of a high-smoking equilibrium versus a low-smoking equilibrium (if one exists), but it
demonstrates the availability of a methodology for comparison.
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smoking, many more potential patrons will have both a smoking
and a nonsmoking bar in their vicinity. The additional options
will likely increase bar patronage. Accordingly, we can tentative-
ly conclude that an equilibrium in which the proportion of smok-
ing bars more closely matches the proportion of smokers in the
general population will likely be superior to one in which those
proportions differ more greatly. Or, more generally, the more
proportionately available the various options, the better.
This conclusion is only tentative because it might be that an
activity such as smoking is highly correlated with bar patron-
age. If this is the case, then an equilibrium closer to the propor-
tion of smokers in the general population might leave the smok-
ing bars overly crowded with patrons, and some smokers will not
have bars they can patronize because of capacity constraints.
This is an empirical question, and one that depends upon
whether bars have excess unused capacity. But the idea that a
more proportional equilibrium is likely to be superior is a useful
rule of thumb, even if it is only a rule of thumb.
Thus, temporary law is efficient when it appears that the
status quo is trapped in a suboptimal equilibrium (a superior
equilibrium exists), there are informational barriers to directly
mandating the better equilibrium (including uncertainty about
whether it actually exists), and the costs of switching between
equilibria are low compared to the efficiency gains.9° Suppose
that a superior equilibrium exists with probability p. Let B be
the efficiency gain from this superior equilibrium compared with
the status quo. Let SC 1 be the cost to individuals of switching
from the status quo to complying with a temporary law (for ex-
ample, a complete smoking ban). Let SCo be the cost to individ-
uals of switching from the temporary legal regime back to the
status quo, and SC2 the cost of switching from the temporary le-
gal regime to a new equilibrium (if one exists). Temporary law is
justified if (and only if):
pB > SC, + pSC2 + (1 - p)SCo
It is worth noting that a number of these terms are related.
As B increases, SC2 will decrease. The reason is that the more
that the new equilibrium diverges from the old equilibrium, and
90 More precisely, we have to consider both the costs of the initial switch to the new
equilibrium the temporary law imposes and the probability of incurring the additional
switching costs, and their magnitude, if the original equilibrium reemerges after the law
expires.
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the more that it resembles the temporary legal regime, the
greater the efficiency benefits of switching to it and the smaller
the number of individuals who will have to switch from the tem-
porary legal regime. Similarly, as SC 1 increases, B increases as
well. That is, if the temporary regime is very far from the cur-
rent equilibrium, switching costs will be higher but the potential
benefits from locating a new equilibrium could be higher as well.
Of course, we hasten to add that if we do not know where
the second equilibrium is located, or even whether that second
equilibrium exists, we cannot know B (the efficiency gain of
reaching that equilibrium) to any degree of certainty. This is one
important sense in which the advantages of temporary law arise
only in the absence of first-best information. The value of gener-
ating equilibrium verification and location can be obtained only
at the risk of B being small and the game not worth the candle.
Accordingly, policy makers should undertake experiments with
temporary law only when they have some intuitive or empirical
reason to believe that p and B are relatively large and SCo-2 rel-
atively small.
This point applies even more strongly to the discovery of
third or fourth equilibria. Suppose that within a given jurisdic-
tion, 95 percent of bars currently permit smoking. Suppose fur-
ther that policy makers have reason to believe that a low-
smoking equilibrium exists and that such an equilibrium would
be welfare superior to the current equilibrium. Policy makers
might reasonably believe that a temporary ban on smoking
could produce welfare gains that outweigh the transition costs
involved, particularly if the LSE is very far from the HSE. The
greater the change in individuals' behavior, the greater the like-
lihood that the benefits from those changes will outweigh the
fixed costs of switching between smoking and nonsmoking re-
gimes.
Now suppose that a temporary ban reveals an LSE in which
75 percent of bars permit smoking. It is of course possible that
there is yet another equilibrium between 75 percent and 95 per-
cent and that this MSE is, for some reason, superior to the LSE.
The existence of an MSE is less likely precisely because the HSE
and LSE are so close to one another. But assuming its existence
and superiority, enacting another temporary law (for instance,
one that licenses 85 percent of bars to permit smoking) will
again create transition costs. These costs will likely be small, be-
cause relatively few bars will be forced to switch. But potential
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gains are small as well, because few people (and bars) will be
changing their behavior. There are fixed costs to enacting a ban
of any type, including legislative costs and the costs of informing
the public. The smaller the potential change in behavior, the
greater the likelihood that these fixed costs will exceed any po-
tential benefits.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the initial temporary ban
reveals an LSE with only 10 percent of bars allowing smoking. If
an MSE exists between 10 percent and 95 percent, which seems
more plausible, a jurisdiction would have greater reason to at-
tempt to locate it, assuming there is reason to believe the MSE
would increase social welfare over the LSE. Because an MSE
might be quite far from either the LSE or HSE, the benefits of
moving to such an equilibrium could conceivably exceed the
costs of getting there.
This analysis also has implications for legal and regulatory
experimentalism. As we described earlier, a number of scholars
have advocated the use of temporary law to experiment with
varied policies. 91 The theory behind these proposals is that if the
new legal regime is inferior to the prior one, policy makers can
simply repeal the law (or allow it to lapse naturally) and return
to the superior status quo ante. However, our theory indicates
that this may not be so easy. If a given legal regime can gener-
ate multiple equilibria under different path-dependent condi-
tions, the post-repeal world may look different from the pre-
regulation world. The new equilibrium might be superior to the
old one, in which case the regulatory experiment turns out to be
beneficial. But it also might be inferior, in which case policy
makers might be required to pass yet another temporary law-
with accompanying transition costs-in order to return to the
true status quo ante. The point is that policy' makers and schol-
ars who hope to experiment with law must consider the possibil-
ity of multiple equilibria when weighing the costs and benefits of
legal interventions.
2. Liberty.
Liberal theory assumes as a default position that govern-
ment should not regulate in the absence of market failure.92 We
91 See note 15.
92 See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 Cardozo L Rev 909, 911 (1994) ("The
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have hypothesized that there may be situations in which market
failure generates a socially suboptimal equilibrium when other,
more efficient equilibria are possible. As we have explained, one
way to move to a more efficient equilibrium is to simply impose
a permanent regulation. But if we are correct that the choice of
market equilibrium is path dependent, then permanent regula-
tion might not be necessary. Policy makers could accomplish the
same (or better) ends by using a temporary law that simply al-
ters the legal path.
If temporality were to become a standard regulatory option,
then those who advocated a permanent ban would have to offer
a rationale for restricting liberty permanently (something other
than path dependence). Temporary law also works against the
general ratcheting effect of increasing government regulation
permeating ever more aspects of human life.93 Because the law
will expire on its own, it does not require coordinated action on
the part of the political branches to return to the unregulated
status quo. Those who favor liberty, as either an instrumental or
an intrinsic good, should thus prefer temporary law to perma-
nent law. Repealing the regulation allows the idiosyncratic to
revert to their preferred behavior. Some or even most smokers
may adjust to no-smoking bars, but those who do not can still
find a bar to indulge their preferences. 94
Nonetheless, we can certainly understand that libertarians
might perceive the idea of temporary law as a threat to liberty
precisely because it appears to lower the stakes. First, there
might be some cases in which the politics of the situation would
not support a permanent regulation but will support a tempo-
rary regulation (as discussed in the next Section). Second, there
is some possibility that the supporters of the regulation will
keep gathering support to extend it, transforming a temporary
regulation into a de facto permanent one. 95
problem of market failure provides the basic public-interest justification for the dis-
placement of private ordering by government intervention.").
93 See Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's
Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failure to Protect Religious
Conduct, 54 Ohio St L J 713, 715 (1993) (describing this ratchet effect).
94 See Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller, Freedom of Contracts *72-73 (un-
published manuscript, 2013) (on file with authors) (describing the value of facilitating
individual idiosyncratic choice when informed decision making may be difficult).
95 See Emily Berman, The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions, 81
Fordham L Rev 1778, 1792 (2013).
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We don't entirely reject these concerns, but we note a few
responses. First, the logic we are proposing does not support the
continuous renewal of temporary regulations. The de facto per-
manency of regulations undermines the credibility of the claim
that the problem being addressed is path dependence. Second,
the implication of our theory is not only the desirability of cer-
tain temporary regulations in the future, but also the fact that
some past regulations that were permanent should have been
temporary. Thus, the argument for temporary regulations sup-
ports the repeal of some existing regulations. Most obviously, if
one justifies smoking bans based on path dependence, our ar-
gument implies the desirability of eventually repealing the bans.
In the final Part, we discuss seat belt laws as another possible
example.
3. Politics.
The final advantage is political: temporary regulation cre-
ates new policy space for political bargains. Because the oppo-
nents of regulation will understand that the status quo ante will
return after the regulatory period ends, they may be less re-
sistant to explicitly temporary rules. Also, the optimism bias
works in favor of this compromise.96 Those favoring the regula-
tion can optimistically believe in their path-dependence argu-
ments, therefore predicting that they will maintain a new equi-
librium after the law is repealed. Those opposed to the
regulation can optimistically believe that the status quo ante is
the only possible equilibrium absent regulation, so it will return
once the temporary law expires. With more space for political
bargains, the stakes are lower, so there will be fewer resources
wastefully invested in the political competition. 97
We note that temporary clauses are common in national and
subnational constitutions, where they are particularly useful as
solutions to bargaining problems. Many constitutional negotia-
tions have the character of bilateral monopoly, in which two par-
ties have no alternative negotiating partners but also have an
96 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Ap-
proach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 1524-25, 1536-37 (1998) (describing
the phenomenon of optimism bias).
97 See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic
Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 Colum L Rev 1516, 1519-25 (2008)
(describing a bargaining model in which the addition of bargaining space increases the
likelihood of an agreement).
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incentive to hold out for a better deal. Temporary provisions can
facilitate needed institutional reforms or allow further infor-
mation to be revealed so that a bargain can be concluded at a
later date. Oftentimes the "temporary" legislation is actually a
rule preventing legislators from overturning a default clause for
a limited period of time. This is not precisely temporary legisla-
tion as we have defined it. But the effect can similarly be one of
revealing information and allowing experiments.
B. Costs
Temporary law also has some important disadvantages rela-
tive to permanent law. These include duplicative switching
costs, incurred when a jurisdiction returns to the status quo
ante, and lower-quality law.
1. Duplicative switching costs.
We anticipate the use of temporary law in situations in
which we are not confident that the status quo ante represents
the only or best equilibrium. In some instances, however, the de-
cision to use temporary law may be wrong. In such an instance,
people may have to switch back to the earlier equilibrium at
some cost.
Consider the smoking-ban example. When the ban on smok-
ing took effect, bars might have hired waitstaff who preferred to
work in a smoke-free environment. When the temporary smok-
ing ban lapses, those employees are more likely to leave for oth-
er jobs, forcing the bar owners to find and hire new employees.
Of course, the very fact that the ban is temporary may lead some
bar owners to hedge their bets and refrain from hiring employ-
ees who are more likely to quit in the future. Similarly, some
smoke-averse employees might avoid taking jobs in bars. But we
acknowledge that there will likely be some fixed costs from
switching that have to be borne twice. Similarly, bars would not
likely have had smoking-related signage when all bars always
allowed smoking. During the period of regulation, bar owners
may have to purchase signage that says "No smoking allowed";
if they choose to allow smoking thereafter, they will need new
signs that indicate that smoking is allowed. These are unrecov-
erable switching costs that result from the temporary law.
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2. Lower-quality law.
When a law is meant to be temporary, legislators might not
invest in writing the highest-quality law.98 It might be overbroad
or underinclusive in some respect, or it might target the wrong
conduct.99 For this reason, temporary law might work best when
the temporary rule is relatively simple, like a smoking ban, and
not as well when the rule requires complex legislative drafting.
Similarly, the law might not be enforced as rigorously as a
permanent law because the officers charged with its enforce-
ment know that it is only temporary. If under-enforcement
dampens the law's impact significantly, then the informational
value of the temporary law could be eliminated. Or private par-
ties might not make as great an effort to comply with the law if
they know it to be temporary. For instance, bar owners might
not bother purchasing new, smoke-free furniture or might in-
stall low-quality signage. If no private parties are forced to
change their conduct because the temporary law is either unen-
forced or easily evaded, then the status quo remains uninter-
rupted.
It is important, then, that the law be designed and enforced
such that there is at least reasonable compliance. Indeed, de-
pending on the context, one might imagine creating a compli-
ance trigger for the law's expiration rather than a simple calen-
dar date. For example, one might say that the law will expire
after eighteen months of a measurably high level of compliance.
This would work if compliance were reasonably easy to measure,
but not otherwise. For example, indoor-smoking compliance can
be checked by devices that measure the chemical traces of tobac-
co smoke in the ambient air.
Yet temporary law will not be a good mechanism for discov-
ering multiple equilibria if there is a significant chance of non-
compliance and no easy way to agree on what the compliance
level is. Relatedly, a poorly designed temporary law might fail to
locate alternative equilibria, frustrating the objective of the en-
terprise and creating duplicative switching costs without any
gains. The behavioral mechanisms that entrench the status quo
98 Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal Law
through a Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 BC L Rev 1327, 1371 (2008) ('[Llegislatures
will take their job less seriously because they know that the legislation is only tempo-
rary.").
99 See Adam Winkler, Free Speech Federalism, 108 Mich L Rev 153, 160 (2009) (of-
fering a definition of high-quality and low-quality law).
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and can thus create multiple equilibria do not reverse them-
selves instantaneously. For instance, if a bar has allowed smok-
ing for twenty years and then is forced by a temporary law to
ban smoking, the new nonsmoking customers who show up on
the first nonsmoking day do not immediately become "available."
They are not yet the bar's regulars, and will not be for some
time. Similarly, bar patrons and employees will not all feel as
though they "own" an entitlement to be free of smoke, for pur-
poses of the endowment effect, on the first day that such a law
springs into existence. Adaptation to new conditions also takes
time, in some cases approximately two years. 00
Accordingly, if a temporary law expires after too short a pe-
riod, it may not succeed in counteracting the behavioral tenden-
cies that had entrenched the previous status quo. Even if an al-
ternative equilibrium exists, the law may not succeed in
discovering it. Private actors will have undergone switching
costs for no reason.
On the other hand, a temporary law with an unnecessarily
long duration can impose needless costs as well. The longer the
temporary law, the longer that private parties are stuck in an
inefficient governmentally mandated situation (for instance, a
complete smoking ban). If a temporary law lasting two years
would be sufficient to locate a new low-smoking equilibrium, and
a city council passes a ten-year ban, those additional eight years
were unnecessary and costly. This is true whether or not a low-
smoking equilibrium exists. Regardless of whether a new equi-
librium exists or whether private parties will return to the old
equilibrium, the extra time spent under a complete prohibition
generates social costs.
Temporary law provides a number of advantages over per-
manent law. For our purposes, the most important of these ad-
vantages is the ability to expose path-dependent equilibria and
reveal situations in which multiple alternative equilibria might
exist. It is for this reason that we believe temporary law offers
the most direct and appropriate response to the multiple-
equilibria problems we described above.
100 See Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, 108 Colum L Rev at 1526 (cited in note
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III. A TEMPORARY SMOKING BAN: THE CASE OF CHAMPAIGN
We know of no smoking ban that was explicitly designed as
temporary. However, we have studied one jurisdiction that unin-
tentionally adopted a temporary ban, in that it enacted and later
repealed a ban on smoking in bars. This Part describes the ban
in some detail.
Champaign (population 82,517) and Urbana (population
41,581) are twin cities that are host to the University of Illinois,
the flagship public university of the state.10' The two cities are
the largest in mostly rural Champaign County, and many local
residents believe that they have different characters, with Ur-
bana being more liberal and willing to regulate business.12 The
cities have different municipal governments, but share certain
governmental functions through special districts, such as a Mass
Transit District and a Public Health District. 1°3
Like many municipalities around the country, Champaign
and its neighboring city of Urbana were subject to pressure from
antismoking groups, as well as resistance from bar owners and
libertarians who sought to retain smoking.104 In the late spring
of 2006, Champaign and Urbana both passed smoking bans, ef-
fective January 2007.105 While Urbana began taking steps to im-
plement the ban, political controversy continued in Champaign.
101 See US Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: Champaign (city), Illinois
(June 27, 2013), online at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/1712385.html (visit.
ed Mar 2, 2014); US Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: Urbana (city), Illinois
(June 27, 2013), online at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/1777005.html (visit-
ed Mar 2, 2014). A third contiguous city, the village of Savoy, had a population of approx-
imately 7,494 in 2012. Census Bureau, State and County QuickFacts: Savoy (village),
Illinois (Jun 2013), online at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfdlstates/17/1767860.html (vis-
ited Mar 2, 2014).
102 See Wikitravel, Champaign-Urbana, online at http://wikitravel.org/en/Champaign
-Urbana (visited Mar 2, 2014) ("Urbana is seen as the more politically liberal and pasto-
ral of the two, and Champaign is seen as having more of a big-city feel.").
103 See, for example, City of Urbana City Government, online at http://urbanaiflinois.us
/government (visited Mar 2, 2014); City of Champaign City Council, online at
http://ci.champaign.il.us/city-council (visited Mar 2, 2014); Champaign- Urbana Mass
Transit District, online at http://www.cumtd.com/about-us (visited Mar 2, 2014); Cham-
paign Urbana Public Health District, online at http://www.c-uphd.org/about-cuphd.html
(visited Mar 2, 2014).
104 The ban proponents were known as the CU Smokefree Alliance; the opponents
were C-U Puff (People United For Freedom), formed to counter the smoking ban and de-
bunk claims of a link between secondhand smoke and cancer rates. See Mike Monson,
Group Turns Its Attention to Urbana; Members Ask City Council to Start Considering a
Smoking Ban, The News Gazette Al (Nov 8, 2005).
105 See Greg Kline, Lights Out; Urbana Council Passes Modified Version, Giving
Taverns More Time to Prepare, The News Gazette Al (June 6, 2006).
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In reaction to the Champaign ban, candidates running for at-
large seats in the city council cited the smoking ban-either
their support or their opposition-as a motivation for entering
politics.106 One argued that the ban was part of an attack on
property rights.107 The ban also led to a challenge to two-term
mayor Jerry Schweighart of Champaign, who had run unop-
posed in the previous election. The challenger cited the smoking
ban as a reason for his candidacy.108
In city council elections held in 2006, ban opponents sup-
ported a slate of candidates that promised to repeal the ban, and
these candidates won handily. Ban proponents expressed disap-
pointment but hoped that a statewide ban under discussion
would preempt the issue.109 On May 1, 2007, the Illinois House of
Representatives passed a smoking ban that would take effect
January 1, 2008,110 but it required the signature of the gover-
nor.", The proposed state ban was stricter than the local ordi-
nances as it banned smoking in all workplaces.
The same day, Champaign Mayor Schweighart announced
that he would nevertheless seek an immediate repeal of the
smoking ban for bars.112 At the next city council meeting on May
15, the repeal passed, effective immediately. 113 It affected only
bars, so restaurants remained smoke-free. Champaign thus be-
came the first jurisdiction in the United States to repeal a smok-
ing ban and provides an example of a temporary smoking ban. 114
Figure 3 below lays out the sequence of events.
106 See Mike Monson, 15 Will Vie for At-Large Seat; Interviews to Take Place Thes-
day, Appointment May Be Made Aug. 15, The News Gazette Al (Aug 2, 2006).
107 See Mike Monson, Primary to Be Held for At-Large Candidates, The News Ga-
zette A5 (Dec 16, 2006).
108 See Mike Monson, Political Newcomer Joins Race for Mayor, The News Gazette
A3 (Dec 19, 2006).
109 Mike Monson, Champaign Mayor to Seek Repeal at May 15 Meeting, The News
Gazette Al (May 2, 2007).
110 Smoke Free Illinois Act, Public Act 95-00017 (2007), codified at 410 ILCS § 82/1
et seq.
111 The bill was not signed into law until June 2007. See Bill Status of SB0500 (Illinois
General Assembly 2007), online at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum
=0500&GAID=9&GA=95&DocTypeID=SB&LegID=28191&SessionID=51&SpecSess=
(visited Mar 2, 2014). The Champaign City Council thus acted in a situation of some le-
gal uncertainty.
112 See Monson, Champaign Mayor to Seek Repeal at Al (cited in note 109).
113 See Mike Monson, Local Bar Patrons Get Choice; City Council Repeals 3-Month-
Old Ban, The News Gazette Al (May 16, 2007).
114 For additional examples of smoking bans repealed shortly after enactment, see
Geneva's Smoking Ban Returns after One- Year Break, Agence France-Presse (Sept 27,
2009) (describing the smoking ban in Geneva, Switzerland, that was brought back by
[81:291
2014] Temporary Law
FIGURE 3. TIMELINE OF CHAMPAIGN-URBANA SMOKING BAN
Date Champaign Urbana
May 2006 Adopts smoking ban
June 2006 Adopts smoking ban
January 2007 Ban takes effect Jan 31 Ban takes effect Jan 1
State Senate introduces Smoke Free Illinois Act
March 2007 State Senate adopts Smoke Free Illinois Act" 5
May 2007 State House adopts Smoke Free Illinois Act
Repeals smoking ban Ban remains in effect
July 2007 Governor Blagojevich signs statewide ban
January 2008 State ban takes effect
Governor Rod Blagojevich signed the statewide ban in Ju-
ly.116 Note that because of the subsequent statewide ban, the
Champaign repeal was also temporary in character, lasting only
7.5 months. While it was uncertain at the time of the repeal
whether the governor would in fact sign the state ban, bar own-
ers who had undergone switching costs to comply with the ban
(discarding ashtrays, disabling ventilation systems, etc.) would
have had to consider the likelihood of a state ban coming into ef-
fect when evaluating whether to absorb the costs of switching
back to smoking. In the aftermath of the repeal, thirty of fifty
bars that we observed returned to smoking.117
voters after being overturned by court); Norcross Repeals City Wide Smoking Ban (July
3, 2012), online at http://atlanta.cbslocal.com/2012/07/03/norcross-repeals-city-wide-smoking
-ban (visited Mar 2, 2014) (reporting repeal of ban in Norcross, Georgia, after a few days
in force); Jonathan M. Seidl, No to Nanny: Kentucky County Repeals Indoor Smoking
Ban (The Blaze Feb 11, 2011), online at http://www.theblaze.comlstories/2011/02/17/no-to
-nanny-kentucky-county-repeals-indoor-smoking-ban (visited Mar 2, 2014) (describing
repeal in Campbell County, Kentucky); Alex Dierckman, Johnson County Repeals Smok-
ing Ban (Dec 13, 2012), online at http://indianapublicmedia.org/news/johnson-county-repeals
-smoking-ban-41710 (visited Mar 2, 2014) (describing the repeal by Johnson County, In-
diana, of a ban stricter than the statewide ban).
115 See Bill Status of SB0500 (cited in note 111).
116 Office of the Governor, Press Release, Gov. Blagojevich Signs Legislation Making
Illinois Smoke-Free; Drastically Reduces the Risk of Second-Hand Smoke for Workers
and the Public (July 23, 2007), online at http://www.idph.state.il.us/public/press07
/7.23.07GovSmokeFreeIL.htm (visited Mar 2, 2014).
117 Data on file with authors. Several bars were closed for the summer, making it
impossible to determine their policy.
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While some of the bar owners that did not return to allow-
ing smoking noted that they had learned about the benefits of
nonsmoking from the ban, they also cited the imminent
statewide ban as a reason not to switch.118 Accordingly, the sub-
sequent statewide ban presents a potential confounding factor.
Nonetheless, we present our findings regarding smoking and
compliance levels because we believe they shed at least some
light on the effects of temporary law in the presence of multiple
equilibria.
We sent observers to monitor the level of smoking and rates
of patronage before and after the smoking ban took effect. For
each bar, we had researchers pay at least three visits at differ-
ent times of day during the week before and after the ban took
effect (January 1, 2007, in Urbana; January 31, 2007, in Cham-
paign). Our observers were instructed to note the total number
of patrons in the bar over the course of an hour, and the number
who smoked during any point in their visit. Bar staff were ex-
cluded from the analysis.
Our initial research concern was to evaluate compliance
with the ban. We found overwhelming compliance with the law,
despite a very weak enforcement structure.119 Out of fifteen bars
in Urbana, all but one immediately exhibited perfect compli-
ance, and that bar was the subject of a complaint. In Cham-
paign, we observed perfect compliance in sixty-three establish-
ments. The high levels of compliance suggest that the law was
working, even without formal enforcement efforts.120 In addition,
for bars in both Urbana and Champaign, we observed an aver-
age of 21.3 patrons in attendance before the ban (n = 281) and
118 See Mike Monson, Several Bars 'Not Going Back'- Two Champaign Owners Say
Business Is Good; Others Would Let Customers Light Up until State Takes Action, The
News Gazette Al (May 14, 2007) (interviewing bar owner and musician Jon "Cody"
Sokolski, who noted that the ban made him feel better when performing on stage, and
also discussed the sunk costs of switching, as well as potential for confusing customers
by reverting before the ban).
119 The official enforcement policy requires repeated warnings, and both police and
the public health district had expressed reluctance to imposing even the minimal puni-
tive fines available under the ordinances. Fines ranged from $165 to $750. Urbana, Illi-
nois Code of Ordinances 1-18 ($165) and 1-10 ($750), online at
http:/library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientlD=1 1645&statelD=13&statename=Illinois
(visited Mar 2, 2014). See also Interview 4a (Apr 16, 2007) (Champaign Police Depart-
ment, on file with authors).
120 This high level of compliance may be an example of what one of us has called the
expressive role of law. See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive
Law, 79 Or L Rev 339, 371-72 (2000). See generally Richard H. McAdams, The Expres-
sive Powers of Law: Theories and Limits (forthcoming Harvard 2014).
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an average of 24.4 in the first month after the ban (n = 13).
Though the sample sizes are too small to demonstrate statistical
significance, this suggests at a minimum that the pre-ban equi-
librium may not have been uniquely optimal. Furthermore,
newspapers reported that revenue was up for Champaign res-
taurants and bars after the ban.121
After the repeal took effect in Champaign on May 15, 2007,
we were able to study the responses of the thirty bars that rein-
stituted smoking. There were fifteen bars for which we had at
least three observations of patronage and smoking behavior both
before the ban and after the repeal. (We also observed patronage
and smoking rates in the interim stage, when the ban was in ef-
fect.) We observed that post-repeal, the bars that returned to
smoking had higher levels of patronage (mean = 44.7) than they
did before the ban went into effect (mean = 29.8). They also ob-
served higher percentages of smoking patrons (37.9 percent
post-repeal vs. 31 percent pre-ban).122 Seventy-five percent of the
bars that returned to smoking showed higher patronage post-
repeal, while 71 percent showed higher concentrations of smok-
ers.123 These data are consistent with the idea that the initial
equilibrium in which all bars allowed smoking was suboptimal
relative to a mixed equilibrium in which some bars allowed
smoking and others did not. The data also provide some evi-
dence for sorting and market segmentation, since the concentra-
tions of smoking were higher after the ban was repealed than
before it was put into effect.
Our interviews revealed a number of different motivations
for returning to smoking. Some of the bar owners felt that
they lost business during the ban, and our observations were
121 Charles Vance, Smoking Ban Revenue (WCIA 3 May 7, 2007), online at
http://www.smokersclubinc.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid= 4 14 6 (visit-
ed Mar 2, 2014). Some reports noted a decline in restaurant tax revenue for the first two
months followed by an increase. See, for example, Mike Monson, C-U Tax Revenues
Spark Debate; Officials Have Different Opinions about Business Impact, The News Ga-
zette Al (May 9, 2007); Monson, Champaign Mayor to Seek Repeal of Smoking Ban at Al
(cited in note 109) (noting that revenues were down in February but up in March 2007).
122 The n is too small to demonstrate statistical significance. Furthermore, we can-
not rule out that the observed differences in patronage are attributable to the different
times of year. The ban was repealed in summer, and it is possible that more people at-
tend bars at that time. On the other hand, the time of year would likely not explain
higher levels of smoking. During summer, people may be able to go outside to smoke,
which is less pleasant in Champaign in the winter. We would thus expect to observe
more smokers inside bars in the winter than in the summer.
123 Data on file with authors.
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consistent with this. Thirteen of the fifteen bars that we ob-
served at least three times had lower average patronage during
the ban then they had beforehand.124 Some identified marginally
higher costs in the form of having to run outdoor heaters for
smokers in winter.125 In addition, some bar owners were them-
selves smokers who felt personally besieged by the ban.126 At
least one bar owner, interviewed during the temporary ban, as-
serted that his bar would revert if the ban were repealed be-
cause "all bars would"; but the bar failed to revert after the re-
peal.127
In short, there were three stages of regulatory development.
In the first, there was no regulation at all, and 100 percent of
bars had smoking. In the second stage, with a ban, 0 percent-of
bars had smoking. In the third stage, after the temporary regu-
lation was repealed, 60 percent of bars had smoking while 40
percent did not. It is our speculation that this last distribution
more closely approximated the actual levels of demand for smok-
ing establishments than did the status quo ante. The temporary
law helped to reveal this equilibrium.
Our interview data are consistent with our theoretical ac-
count: bar owners who did not switch back reported a variety of
motivations. While some of them did mention the possibility of
the state ban, others reported that they had themselves learned
how pleasant it was not to have pervasive smoke. One inter-
viewee reported that he himself was a nonsmoker but had
feigned opposition to the ban to keep customers. 128 Another, who
had opposed the ban on libertarian grounds, disclosed that he
had not reverted to allowing smoking because he found that
nonsmoking provided a superior environment.129 While it is only
anecdotal, some interviewees reported that the potential
statewide ban was not an issue in their decision not to return to
smoking. Lower cleaning costs and the transition costs of rein-
stalling air purification equipment were also cited as reasons for
remaining nonsmoking, even after smoking was again allowed.130
These rationales suggest that even without the subsequent
124 Patronage declined from an average of 29.8 patrons to an average of 24.8. This is
despite the fact that most bars experienced higher patronage.
125 Interview R2 (Apr 13, 2007) (on file with authors).
126 Id.
127 Interview R4 (Apr 13, 2007) (on file with authors).
128 Interview T14A (May 30, 2007) (on file with authors).
129 Interview T17 (June 2, 2007) (on file with authors).
130 Interview R5 (May 29, 2007) (on file with authors).
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statewide ban, the temporary smoking ban would have led to a
new post-ban equilibrium in which less than 100 percent of bars
allowed smoking.
IV. GENERAL APPLICATIONS
We believe that the argument for temporary law generalizes
to many forms of paternalistic regulation, as well as other issues
likely to present multiple equilibria but significant barriers to
determining the optimal one. In this Part we describe several
other situations in which we believe that multiple equilibria ex-
ist and temporary laws could be profitably employed or are al-
ready in use.
A. Seat Belts
Seat belts save lives. However, before they were in wide-
spread use, people felt that they were inconvenient and uncom-
fortable.13' This led to very low rates of seat belt usage and the
adoption, in the United States, of "technology-forcing regulation"
that required automobile manufacturers to include so-called
"passive measures" in all cars. 132 This led in turn to the techno-
logical development of automatically locking seatbelts (which
were wildly unpopular) and airbags. 133 The issue was a major
regulatory battleground, with successive political administra-
tions adopting different rules.13 Today, many states have enact-
ed mandatory seat belt laws, which have been shown to increase
seat belt usage. These laws are permanent.
We can imagine a path-dependence argument that supports
only limited government intervention in the form of a temporary
law. We will not rehearse all the reasons that seat belt use
might have multiple equilibria, but here are two. First, as previ-
ously discussed, there are signaling effects when drivers have
131 See Robert Howse, Retrenchment, Reform or Revolution? The Shift to Incentives
and the Future of the Regulatory State, 3 Alberta L Rev 455, 468-69 (1993) (assessing
costs and benefits of seat belts and including discomfort); Jerry L. Mashaw and David L.
Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety 64-65, 202-23 (Harvard 1990) (describing the polit-
ical struggle over seat belt laws).
132 Howse, 3 Alberta L Rev at 468-69 (cited in note 131); Mashaw and Harfst, The
Struggle for Auto Safety at 202-23 (cited in note 131).
133 See Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Association of the United States, Inc v State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 463 US 29, 36 (1983) (describing the seventeen-
year regulatory fight).
134 See John D. Graham, Auto Safety: Assessing America's Performance 76-83 (Au-
burn House 1989) (describing the history of Congress and seat belt laws).
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passengers because, when usage in a society is low, a passenger
who wears a seat belt may insult the driver by suggesting that
he or she is incompetent. 135 Even the driver might incur social
costs by wearing a seat belt when no one else does because,
against the social practice, the driver seems unattractively tim-
id, fearful, or incompetent. By contrast, when seat belt usage is
high, wearing a belt does not convey distrust of the driver or
great timidity. Thus, there are multiple equilibria.
Second, there are ways in which behavioral biases exacer-
bate the standard switching costs. At first, wearing a seat belt is
uncomfortable and requires conscious effort, but after a time one
develops a habit of buckling up and doesn't notice much discom-
fort.136 Individuals must decide whether to invest in developing
the habit and might rationally decide not to. Individuals with
limited self-control might wish to invest in the habit but none-
theless procrastinate;137 those subject to affective forecasting er-
rors will overestimate how long it takes to adjust to the initial
discomfort and therefore mistakenly decide not to acquire the
habit. 138 In all of these cases, individuals who started out wear-
ing seat belts would make different decisions than individuals
who did not start out wearing seat belts.
For this reason, if one rejects wholehearted paternalism, one
could still justify temporary mandates under our theory. But the
theory implies that we should phase out such laws in states
where they have existed for some time (perhaps with an excep-
tion for new drivers, discussed below). Having raised total usage
to historically high rates, there is no longer a social cost to wear-
ing a seat belt as a driver or passenger. Having coerced drivers
into the experience of wearing a seat belt, most have developed
the habit now and would continue on without coercion. Those
who would not continue on might have strong (if idiosyncratic)
reasons not to wear them. As with smokers, the efficient out-
come might be to permit those who continue to prefer the risky
behavior to have their way, given that a temporary law is suffi-
cient to cause most people to take the less risky behavior.
135 See Lessig, 62 U Chi L Rev at 952 (cited in note 57) (describing the social mean-
ing of putting on a seat belt in a Budapest taxi).
136 See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U Chi L
Rev 1129, 1137 (1986) ("Suppose that the costs of initial use are quite high; when drivers
and passengers first buckle the belts, they do so unwillingly. Suppose too that the costs
associated with buckling decrease sharply once one has gotten into the habit.").
137 See text accompanying note 62.
138 See Part I.C.2.
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Such temporary laws or the repeal of existing laws might
treat new drivers differently. A temporary condition for a new
license might be the requirement that one use a seat belt for a
time, say two to four years, after which the driver can obtain a
license that does not require the behavior. Drivers might adapt
to the new condition and learn that they do not mind the belt
that they initially hated. In light of the health and safety bene-
fits, most of them might continue the behavior after it is no
longer required. But those who continue to find it extremely un-
pleasant can stop. In this way, temporary regulation might pre-
serve liberties while changing behavior for the substantial ma-
jority of people.
B. Affirmative Action
Proponents of affirmative action characterize the market as
producing a suboptimal level of educational or workforce partic-
ipation by racial minorities, females, or other underrepresented
groups. The idea here draws from path dependence. Given past
patterns of educational and employment discrimination, the re-
moval of explicit discrimination alone may be insufficient to re-
veal an "optimal" equilibrium that reflects the actual distribu-
tion of talent in society. Indeed, it is possible that there will be
continuing market failures based on information asymmetries.
For example, employers making hiring decisions may rely on ex-
isting levels of workforce participation in considering new hires.
The result would be very slow or even no progress toward an op-
timal hiring equilibrium.
Affirmative action is conceived of as helping to overcome
this kind of market failure. It is usually considered to be a "tem-
porary" remedy, a point made quite explicit by Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor in her Grutter v Bollinger 39 opinion. 14° In uphold-
ing the University of Michigan's use of race in undergraduate
admissions, O'Connor noted that "race-conscious admissions pol-
icies must be limited in time" and suggested that the interest of
the university in utilizing such policies would not last more than
139 539 US 306 (2003).
140 Id at 342.
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a period of twenty-five years.141 A similar argument may make
sense in the context of Title VII.142
Indeed, international law conceives of affirmative action as
inherently temporary in character. The International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
states that affirmative action programs "shall in no case entail
as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights
for different racial groups after the objectives for which they
were taken have been achieved."143 The temporary and remedial
nature of affirmative action distinguishes it from "ordinary" ra-
cial discrimination.
The affirmative action story fits the case for a temporary
law. It is easy to agree that the status quo ante produced an in-
efficient equilibrium because of the legacy of public and private
discrimination, continuing behavioral biases, and underinvest-
ment in human capital by those discriminated against as a ra-
tional response to lack of opportunities. Discrimination en-
trenches the status quo over time when markets are the only
remedial mechanism. 144 At the same time, it is unclear what the
precise level of participation is for any particular group in any
particular market. An approach that sets quotas for participa-
tion is an attempt to move toward a particular specified equilib-
rium. It may be more efficient than the situation of no regula-
tion, but it is hard to tell, as the informational barriers are
large. Affirmative action can be viewed as an attempt to inter-
vene in labor and educational markets so as to better reveal the
optimal equilibrium-that which would exist in the absence of
either a discriminatory starting point or mandatory quotas. 145
141 Id at 342-43.
142 See John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U Pa L Rev 1411, 1423-28
(1986) (showing that the work of Title VII is frontloaded and will drive discriminators
from the marketplace).
143 Resolution 2106 (XX), UN General Assembly, 1406th mtg (Dec 21, 1965), UN Doc
A/6014 48.
144 See generally Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Inequality: The Persistence of Discrim-
ination, 9 Mich J Race & L 31 (2003); Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, 12 Va J
Soc Pol & L 197 (2004).
145 A temporary scheme may be superior to the status quo ante of no regulation, but
may also generate rent-seeking behavior that makes it difficult to let the law expire.
Even so, the need to review the programs after set periods puts some burden on propo-
nents to justify the extensions and surely is superior to a permanent scheme. Malaysia
provides an interesting illustration of a temporary affirmative action scheme, but also
the political difficulties of modifying it once it has been established. When drafting the
Malaysian Constitution, the Reid Commission of the United Kingdom sought to ensure
the special position of the indigenous Malays, who formed a narrow majority of the
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C. Curfews and Crime
Another example of explicitly temporary law is a curfew.
Curfews are restrictions on presence in public spaces, usually
adopted to combat crime or to otherwise change the social dy-
namics of a particular locality. The rationale is that the status
quo ante represents a suboptimal equilibrium that can be reme-
died by a temporary disruption to the pattern of social interac-
tion. For example, if young people have the habit of congregating
each evening in a particular location, each individual will have
an expectation that others will show up at the same spot. If the
people in question are drug dealers or criminals, there may be
significant externalities from this equilibrium. A temporary ban
can disrupt expectations about where and when to congregate,
and thus may change the equilibrium level of crime or drug
dealing after the ban is lifted.
In Laurel, Delaware, for example, Mayor John Shwed insti-
tuted an emergency curfew for nonresidents of the Carvel resi-
dent complex on February 22, 2012.146 The curfew was imposed
in response to an increase in violence and gang activity, and re-
mained in effect from 10:00 p.m. through 6:00 a.m.147 The effect
of the curfew was apparently positive; the town's police chief
noted that it was followed by an almost 60 percent decrease in
complaints of criminal activities at the housing complex. As a
result of reduced violence, the mayor decided not to extend the
population but were economically far behind the ethnic Chinese and Indian subjects of
British Malaya. See Kenz6 Horii, Disintegration of the Colonial Economic Legacies and
Social Restructuring in Malaysia, 29 Developing Econ 281, 285-87 (1991). The Commis-
sion recommended setting aside a certain number of public service commissions, busi-
ness licenses, and university scholarships for Malays, but also suggested that these pro-
visions expire fifteen years after independence. Report of the Federation of Malaya
Constitutional Commission 1957 163-67 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office),
online at http://www.krisispraxis.com/Constitutional%20Commission%201957.pdf (visit-
ed Mar 2, 2014) (describing the current situation and noting that there was agreement
for continuing preferences on a temporary basis). However, the affirmative action
scheme was retained after the subset period, and remains largely intact today. See Bar-
bara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia 297-303 (Hawaii 2d
ed 2001) (describing ethnic tensions and violence, with the New Economic Policy adopted
as a solution). But see Joseph Chin, MRCB, Pos in Focus after PM Unveils New Econom-
ic Model (The Edge Malaysia Mar 30, 2010), online at http://www.theedgemalaysia.com
/highlights/162642-mrcb-pos-in-focus-after-pm-unveils-new-economic-model.html (visited
Mar 2, 2014) (discussing the prime minister's announcement of review and gradual
phase out of quotas).
146 Glenn Rolfe, Carvel Gardens Non-resident Curfew Lifted (Newszap.com Mar 15,
2013), online at http://delaware.newszap.com/southerndelawarell16306-70/carvel-gardens
-non-resident-curfew-lifted (visited on Mar 2, 2014).
147 Id.
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curfew, and it was removed on September 4th, 2012.148 City offi-
cials and residents believed that crime would not go back to the
precurfew level' 49 and, though there is no hard data, there has
been no news of rising crime.
Curfews like that found in Laurel are not uncommon and
have been implemented in East St. Louis, Philadelphia, and
other cities. 15o In a democracy, permanent restrictions on liberty
are frowned upon, so curfews may be framed as temporary in
nature, or else restricted to minors. For example, the Philadel-
phia curfew adopted in October 2011, specifically meant to re-
spond to problems with flash mobs, was, at its creation, set to
expire on December 15th, 2013.15 The Philadelphia Police De-
partment claims that the law has been effective in reducing
crime and has incentivized the city to provide youth with alter-
native activities including bowling nights and spending more
time at recreation centers. 152 In short, the temporary curfew is a
tool employed with some regularity in democracies that illus-
trates the use of temporary law to find superior equilibria. It is
obviously superior relative to a permanent restriction on liberty.
As a corollary, consider the crime problem we described in
Part I.C.1, in which a neighborhood is crime ridden because
there is insufficient foot traffic at night. This is effectively the
opposite of the curfew problem. One could imagine a temporary
law requiring individuals to frequent a particular neighborhood
at night, but that would likely be viewed as too great an intru-
sion upon personal liberty to be viable. (It would also be difficult
to enforce.) Instead, a community might solve the collective ac-
tion problem by temporarily increasing the police presence in
the neighborhood. If there are enough police to guarantee safety,
148 Tony E. Windsor, Laurel Officials Stop Emergency Curfew at Public Housing
Complex (Laurel Star), online at http://www.laurelstar.com/index.cfm?ref
=42578&ref2=380 (visited Mar 2, 2014).
149 See Laurel Plans to Let Emergency Curfew Expire (WBOC 16 Sept 14, 2012),
online at http://www.wboc.com/story/19430430/town-plans-to-let-emergency-curfew-expire
(visited Mar 2, 2014).
150 See, for example, Barry Leibowitz, Curfew, Dress Code, Imposed on Teens to
Combat Crime in East St. Louis (CBS News Sept 28, 2012), online at
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57521814-504083/curfew-dress-code-imposed-on
-teens-to-combat-crime-in-east-st-louis (visited Mar 2, 2014) (East St. Louis); Manola
Gonzalez, City Curfew Law Creates Controversy (The Daily Pennsylvanian Feb 13, 2012),
online at http://www.thedp.com/r/25f15d3d (visited Mar 2, 2014) (Philadelphia).
151 Gonzalez, City Curfew Law (cited in note 150). See also City of Philadelphia Bill
No 110633 (terminating the curfew, codified at Philadelphia Code § 10-303, on December
15th, 2013).
152 Gonzalez, City Curfew Law (cited in note 150).
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any individual could frequent the neighborhood without worry-
ing about how many other individuals will be there. If the
neighborhood amenities are sufficiently attractive, sufficient
numbers of people will begin to frequent the neighborhood, cre-
ating a safe high-traffic equilibrium that is sustainable even af-
ter the police presence has slackened.
D. Traffic: Congestion Pricing in Sweden
Traffic is another problem potentially amenable to analysis
from the perspective of multiple equilibria. Traffic causes all
kinds of externalities and is universally regulated in some form
or another. Many cities have experimented with so-called con-
gestion pricing, in which costs of driving in crowded downtown
areas increase during peak usage times. One might imagine that
an effect of this pricing would be to incentivize drivers to take
public transit or other alternative means of transportation. If so,
it might be conceivable that a temporary scheme of congestion
pricing would be sufficient to induce lower levels of driving.
We know of one experiment with temporary regulation in
this regard. From January to July 2006, Stockholm instituted a
trial period of congestion pricing to reduce traffic.153 The pricing
program put a flat rate of $2.60 on all vehicles entering Stock-
holm during peak hours, and a rate ranging from $1.30 to $2 for
other times during the day.5 By the time the trial ended on Ju-
ly 31, 2006, Stockholm had experienced a 22 percent drop in
traffic and travel time.155
Following the trial period, a referendum was held in Sep-
tember 2006 allowing residents to decide whether to reintroduce
the system on a permanent basis. The pricing system was ap-
proved by 52 percent of the city's voters, and was thus reintro-
duced in August 2007.156 Both the congestion policy and the
153 Alan Atkisson, Letter from Stockholm: Goodbye, for Now, to a Successful Traffic
Congestion Tax (Worldchanging Aug 4, 2006), online at http://www.worldchanging.com
/archives/004781.html (visited Mar 2, 2014).
154 See Brad Plumer, How Sweden Cut Traffic Congestion, Wonkblog (The Washing-
ton Post Dec 15, 2011), online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post
/how-sweden-cut-traffic-congestionl2011/12/15/gIQA3xPVwOblog.html (visited Mar 2,
2014).
155 See Derrick Z. Jackson, The Cure for Congestion, Boston Globe (Aug 5, 2012).
156 See Bjirn HArsman and John M. Quigley, Political and Public Acceptability of
Congestion Pricing: Ideology and Self-Interest, 29 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt 854, 856
(2010).
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subsequent period of driving without a fee were temporary in
character.
The initial experiment was conducted on a temporary basis
primarily for political reasons. 57 In the 2002 national election,
the Social Democrats won a plurality and formed a government
by attracting the support of the Environmentalist Party.158 In re-
turn, the Social Democrats agreed to the congestion-pricing ex-
periment. 159 They also had to convince the Stockholm Social
Democrats, who had promised not to engage in congestion pric-
ing, to implement the experiment.160 Popular support for the
program was low before the trial started.161 A poll in fall 2005
showed that around 43 percent of Stockholm residents support-
ed the decision to conduct a congestion pricing trial.162 In fact,
when the trial started, public opposition to the fees ran as high
as 75 percent.1 63 By May 2006, however, support had increased:
only 41 percent of Stockholm residents thought the trial was a
bad idea.164 The temporary law thus revealed information about
preferences. Support consistently increased and by May 2011,
support for the policy was at 70 percent. The reason for this
support is still unclear: it could be because people enjoyed fewer
traffic jams and delays, people adjusted their driving patterns,
people shifted to public transit, or a combination of the three.65
Interestingly, although a new political equilibrium was pro-
duced by the temporary law, the underlying levels of driving
were unaffected during the immediate post-trial period. The
congestion policy was not in place between July 2006 (when the
trial period ended) and August 2007 (when the policy was re-
introduced permanently). During this period, traffic rose
close to the level it had been before congestion pricing was
157 See id.
158 Id at 859.
159 Id.
160 HArsman and Quigley, 29 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt at 859 (cited in note 156).
161 See id.
162 Id.
163 See Jackson, The Cure for Congestion (cited in note 155).
164 Muriel Beser Hugosson and Jonas Eliasson, The Stockholm Congestion Charging
System-An Overview of the Effects after Six Months (Proceeding of European Transport
Conference Feb 2, 2006), online at http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/athena/course11/11.951/oldstuff
/albacete/Other-Documents/Europe%2OTransport%2oConferencetraffic-engineering-an
/thestockholm_congl720.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014).
165 See Plumer, How Sweden Cut Traffic Congestion (cited at note 154).
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ever implemented.166 Had driving levels stayed low, of course,
there would have been less need for a permanent congestion-
pricing policy.167 So one outcome of this experiment was to reveal
that a temporary law was insufficient to reorder the underlying
behavior that was the target of regulation. This was not a case
of multiple equilibria, a fact that the temporary ban revealed.
We include this example to illustrate that temporary law may
occasionally fail to validate the existence of a second equilibri-
um. When this is the case, policy makers must simply adopt the
approach that Swedish authorities followed here: decide whether
a permanent law is warranted by some market failure other
than path dependence.
E. Bank Holidays and Trading Curbs
Examples of temporary law can also be found in the finan-
cial sector. Consider first the problem of a run on a bank. Bank
runs are caused when too many depositors try to pull their de-
posits out of a bank in too short of a time frame.168 Even when
the bank is solvent, it might not have sufficient liquidity to pay
all of the depositors at once, causing the bank to fail.169 The prob-
lem can be self-reinforcing: the more depositors who withdraw
their money from the bank, the more that the remaining deposi-
tors must fear that the bank will not have sufficient reserves to
pay them if they attempt to withdraw funds.170
Accordingly, a bank run can be driven by a rational collec-
tive action problem: it is separately rational for each individual
to rush to the bank and withdraw her money, even if it would be
collectively superior if they were all to leave their money on de-
posit.171 A bank run can also be caused by behavioral errors,
namely panic-an irrational stampede to the exit.172
166 Ed Pike, Congestion Charging: Challenges and Opportunities *12 (International
Council on Clean Transportation, Apr 2010), online at http://www.theicct.org/sites
/default/files/publications/congestionaprlO.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014).
167 See Jackson, The Cure for Congestion (cited in note 155).
168 See Helen A. Garten, What Price Bank Failure?, 50 Ohio St L J 1159, 1168-69
(1989) (describing bank runs).
169 Id.
170 Id. See also McAdams, 82 S Cal L Rev at 216-17 (cited in note 10) (describing a
bank run as a coordination game with multiple equilibria).
171 See Krishna G. Mantripragada, Depositors as a Source of Market Discipline, 9
Yale J Reg 543, 560-61 (1992) (describing the mechanisms that can trigger bank runs).
172 Id.
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We can thus conceive of the banking system as operating at
one of two equilibria: a "stable" equilibrium, in which banks are
solvent, depositors have no need to pull out their money, and no
one is panicked; and a "running' equilibrium, in which banks
may lack necessary liquidity, depositors are in the midst of a
race to withdraw their funds, and panic is widespread. Both of
these equilibria are self-reinforcing, in the sense that no indi-
vidual has an incentive to change her behavior absent an exoge-
nous shock of some sort (such as a news report that a bank has
become insolvent).173
Suppose that one or more banks tip into a dangerous "run-
ning" equilibrium and depositors are racing to withdraw their
deposits. How might policy makers trigger a switch to a stable
equilibrium? The solution that President Franklin Roosevelt
employed during the Great Depression was a temporary law: a
bank holiday during which banks were closed and no money
could be deposited or withdrawn.174 These bank holidays typical-
ly lasted only a few days, but nonetheless they effectively flipped
the status quo. 175 Before the inception of the temporary law,
banks and customers were stuck in a running equilibrium.
When the law elapsed, the status quo was zero activity-no one
had been making withdrawals, precisely because of the holiday.
If we believed that only one equilibrium-a running equilib-
rium-was possible, we should have expected a bank run to re-
sume immediately after a bank holiday ended. But this is not
what occurred. Roosevelt's bank holidays were generally quite
successful at ending bank runs. 176 This indicates that a simple
change in the starting point, produced by temporary law, can re-
sult in a very different outcome due to path dependence.
Trading curbs, sometimes known as trading "circuit break-
ers," play a similar role in arresting steep declines in securities
markets. Just like a bank run, a stock market crash or a precipi-
tous drop in the price of a single stock might be caused by either
173 See, for example, News Report Triggers Another Bank Run (Taipei Times May 25,
2000), online at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives2000/05/25/0000037364
(visited Mar 2, 2014).
174 See William L. Silber, Why Did FDR's Bank Holiday Succeed?, 15 Econ Pol Rev
19, 19-23 (2009) (offering a description of Roosevelt's bank holidays).
175 See id.
176 See id (describing the success of bank holidays at stabilizing the banking sys-
tem).
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rational or irrational factors.17 From a rational perspective, if
one investor sees other investors selling a stock (or many
stocks), causing its price to drop, she might rationally choose to
sell as well in order to avoid being left holding a much lower-
priced asset. 1'7 8 This could be the case even if she believes that
the stock is actually worth more than the current price. She may
need liquidity in the near future and be unable to hold onto the
stock long enough to wait for it to rise.179 And of course she may
take the drop in the stock's price as information that the stock is
worth much less than she believed.180 What she believes to be
true information could actually be an information cascade,181 in
which each individual believes that the others have valuable in-
formation when in fact no one (or only the few people who trig-
ger the cascade) knows anything of significance. 182
On the other hand, investors might be irrationally panick-
ing about a stock (or an entire market or economy) and needless-
ly rushing to unload securities and hide their money in some-
thing safer183 In either case, the stock market is trapped in a
self-destructive equilibrium.84 This is opposed to the typical
177 See generally, for example, Robert J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton
2d ed 2005) (describing market irrationality). See also Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient
Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J Econ Persp 59, 73-74 (Winter 2003) ("Share pric-
es can be highly sensitive as a result of rational responses to small changes in interest
rates and risk perceptions."); Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers, and Franklin Allen,
Principles of Corporate Finance 340-68 (McGraw-Hill 10th ed 2011).
178 See Gadi Barlevy and Pietro Veronesi, Rational Panics and Stock Market Crash-
es, 110 J Econ Theory 223, 255-56 (2003) (explaining the method by which rational, un-
informed investors sell stocks when observing prices drop).
179 See, for example, Antonio E. Bernardo and Ivo Welch, Liquidity and Financial
Market Runs, 119 Q J Econ 135, 135 (2004) (describing how a 'liquidity shock" may force
an investor to sell stocks).
180 See Kenneth R. French, Crash-Testing the Efficient Market Hypothesis, in Stan-
ley Fischer, ed, 3 National Bureau of Economic Research Macroeconomics Annual 277,
277-86 (MIT 1988) ("[E]conomic agents rationally combine their own private information
with the information they infer from observed prices and volume.... [A study suggests]
investors over-react to each other's trades."). See also generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Sym-
posium on Bubbles, 4 J Econ Persp 13 (Spring 1990) (discussing divergent views on the
extent to which prices of assets represent "fundamental" values).
181 Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale L
J 71, 82-83 (2000).
182 See Shiller, Irrational Exuberance at 153-65 (cited in note 177).
183 See, for example, id. See also Allen M. Poteshman and Vitaly Serbin, Clearly Ir-
rational Financial Market Behavior: Evidence from the Early Exercise of Exchange Trad-
ed Stock Options, 58 J Fin 37, 47-55 (2003) (finding evidence of irrational market behav-
ior).
184 It is of course possible that the stock or the market is highly overvalued and the
crash is appropriate. But it is widely believed that stock market crashes (or run-ups)
The University of Chicago Law Review
market equilibrium in which investors are not panicked and are
not chasing one another into a downward spiral.
The solution to the problem of stock market crashes is a
temporary law very similar to Roosevelt's bank holidays. Every
major securities exchange in the United States imposes trading
curbs, otherwise known as "circuit breakers," that automatically
cut off trading in a stock or an entire market when that market
falls by a certain percentage in a single day.185 These circuit
breakers are even more temporary than bank holidays: they typ-
ically last only until the end of the trading day.186 But just like
bank holidays, they reverse the status quo. Before the circuit
breaker takes effect, the market is stuck in a "running" equilib-
rium. After the circuit breaker has lapsed (the very next day),
the market is starting from a stable equilibrium. If there is in
fact only one possible equilibrium-that is, if the stock market
crash is based on correct, rational valuations of the securities-
then we should expect the crash to resume the very next day as
the running equilibrium reemerges. But in fact market circuit
breakers often halt stock market crashes, with the market re-
verting to a stable equilibrium and rising the next day.187 Such is
the power of temporary law to locate a second potential equilib-
rium, even when that temporary law lasts only part of a day.188
CONCLUSION
Conflicts between libertarians and those in favor of regu-
lation, along with new attention to behavioral biases, have
frequently occur even when there is no economic basis for them. See, for example,
Shiller, Irrational Exuberance at 132-43 (cited in note 177).
185 US Securities and Exchange Commission, Investor Bulletin: New Measures to
Address Market Volatility (Apr 9, 2013), online at http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts
/circuitbreakersbulletin.htm (visited Mar 2, 2014).
186 See id.
187 See Beni Lauterbach and Uri Ben-Zion, Stock Market Crashes and the Perfor-
mance of Circuit Breakers: Empirical Evidence, 48 J Fin 1909, 1909 (1993) (collecting
literature and finding that "[clircuit breakers ... reduced the next-day opening order
imbalance and the initial price loss").
188 Of course, not all temporary interventions in the market are so successful. In
August 1971, President Richard Nixon sought to curb inflation by imposing temporary
wage and price controls. See President Nixon Imposes Wage and Price Controls (The
Econ Review), online at http://www.econreview.com/events/wageprice1971b.htm (visited
Mar 2, 2014). Some policy makers seemed to believe that the United States was stuck in
an inflationary equilibrium, in which wages and prices collectively spiraled higher, and
that a temporary ban on increases would restore a lower-inflation equilibrium. See id.
That turned out not to be the case, as inflation continued to increase throughout the dec-
ade in the face of repeated unsuccessful interventions. See id.
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motivated a search for more effective and less intrusive regula-
tory devices. In this Article, we highlight one such mechanism:
temporary law. We show that under certain conditions, it is pos-
sible to utilize temporary law to identify information on the
most efficient outcome, and to do so in a way that is less politi-
cally costly than an equivalent permanent law. These conditions
occur when (1) there are multiple equilibria and good reasons for
believing that the status quo is stuck in an inefficient equilibri-
um, and (2) there are informational barriers to identifying the
superior equilibrium.
Using the example of smoking bans, we have shown that
temporary law is plausible and likely to be superior to a perma-
nent law on several dimensions. The temporary approach will be
better at revealing information than a permanent ban, which
imposes a new equilibrium without establishing that it is the op-
timal equilibrium. A temporary ban will certainly be less intru-
sive of the liberties of smokers. And it is likely to be politically
easier to adopt, given that the costs will not be borne perma-
nently. The explicitly experimental, information-forcing ra-
tionale of temporary law may win over some opponents of par-
ticular policies. The idea of temporary law easily generalizes, as
we show by applying it beyond the smoking example to seat belt
mandates, affirmative action policies, curfews, traffic regulation,
and bank holidays.
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